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ABSTRACT
John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corpo-
rations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made
about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even
arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought
for symbolic reasons—some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only
consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held account-
able for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However,
these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with inten-
tional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law
doctrines are not responsive to the threat these suits pose to Internet
discourse. Although the constitutional privilege for opinion holds
promise as a solution to this problem, the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence provides little assurance that the privilege can protect the “ro-
bust, uninhibited, and wide-open nature” of Internet discourse with-
out giving Internet speakers free license to harm the reputation of
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others. Therefore, this Article attempts to articulate a theory that justi-
fies protecting John Doe and suggests the steps courts should take to
adapt the existing opinion privilege to the unique context of cyber-
space.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a
whole society.1
[T]he First Amendment . . . presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and al-
ways will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.2
John Doe is a day trader.3 Trading stocks is a hobby bordering on
an obsession, and, like many other day traders, John Doe likes to ex-
change information about stocks via online message boards.4 But as
Doe recently learned, free speech on the Internet may not be as free
as he thought. After posting a scathing message accusing Net Com-
pany of defrauding its investors and accusing its CEO of being a liar
and a cheat, John Doe found himself a defendant in a libel suit.5
1. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (opinion of the
court by Judge Learned Hand), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
3. See CHRISTOPHER A. FARRELL, DAY TRADE ONLINE 2, 14 (1999) (defining day trad-
ing as “the practice of buying and selling stocks over the Internet for quick profits” and esti-
mating that by the year 2000 there will be 10 million individual accounts online).
4. See Matthew Heimer, Herd on the Net, BRILL’S CONTENT (May 1999)
<http://www.brillscontent.com/columns/moneypress_0599.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (discussing the influence and popularity of Internet financial bulletin boards, including
Raging Bull, Silicon Investor, and Yahoo! Finance). Ordinarily, users like John Doe post to mes-
sage boards devoted solely to discussion of a particular corporation (the Net Company message
board, for example). See, e.g., Michael Moss, CEO Exposes, Sues Anonymous Online Critics,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 1999, at B1 (noting that Yahoo! “has several thousand [financial message]
boards, each dedicated to a single company”).
This Article uses the term “message board” synonymously with “computer bulletin
board,” which at least one author has defined as “a computerized version of a cork and pin
board on which users can post, read, and respond to messages.” Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, De-
fining Cyberlibel: A First Amendment Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arising from
Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 238 (1995). This Article draws
no distinction in this discussion between boards that are available via the Internet and those that
are available only to subscribers of a particular commercial online service. See id. at 243-46 (ex-
amining the differences between Internet-supported boards and those run by commercial online
services).
5. See generally Rebecca Landwehr, Companies Battle Libel on the Web, DENV. BUS. J.,
Oct. 9, 1998, at A3 (anticipating “a flurry of court actions” over libelous statements posted in
Internet chat rooms); Steve Woodward, Three Corporations Go to Court to Fight Internet False-
hoods, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5 (“John Doe may be the most wanted person in cy-
berspace. Corporations everywhere . . . are tracking him down in lawsuits that allege sins rang-
ing from interference with business relationships to defamation to breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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This hypothetical case, Net Company v. John Doe, is typical of a
rapidly expanding new category of Internet libel suits.6 One of the
6. This Article refers to these as “Internet” libel suits for consistency of reference even
though some suits may involve statements posted on bulletin boards available only through
commercial service providers. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“The
Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects in-
numerable smaller groups of linked computer networks.”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). For a dis-
cussion of the history and technological features of the Internet, see, for example, David P.
Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 229, 229-32 (1996); Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderators for Defama-
tion Published by Others: Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, 47 FLA. L. REV. 247,
251-53 (1995).
In the typical case, plaintiffs sue an unknown “John Doe” defendant for defamation and
then subpoena John Doe’s Internet service provider (“ISP”) to uncover his identity. See, e.g.,
Complaint, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed Oct. 28,
1998) (alleging that John Doe, later discovered to be Peter Krum, posted that HealthSouth
Corporation and its CEO were engaging in fraudulent behavior and that the CEO’s wife was
having an adulterous affair) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Bob Cook, Down and
Dirty: PhyCor and Other Companies Sue Anonymous Message Posters for Internet Mudslinging,
MOD. PHYSICIAN, June 1, 1999, at 30 (“By suing defendants called John Does, a company or an
aggrieved person can convince a judge to issue a subpoena forcing an Internet service provider
to turn over the e-mail addresses and identities of the message posters.”).
Although many of these cases have not yet made their way into reported decisions, I shall
list them here by party names for ease of reference. See American Eco Corp. v. John Doe, dis-
cussed in American Eco Wins Libel Suit Against Internet Critic, NAT’L POST, Dec. 15, 1998, at
C2 (reporting that a corporation and its former executive were awarded $8.325 million against
an unknown John Doe); Americare Health Scan v. Technical Chem. & Prods., Inc., discussed in
Americare Health Scan Files Libel Suit Against TCPI and Individuals over Anonymous Yahoo!
Postings, BUS. WIRE, June 18, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File; BioShield
Tech., Inc. v. John Does # 1-3, discussed in INVESTOR RELATIONS BUSINESS, Sept. 20, 1999;
Carnegie Int’l v. John Does # 1-3, discussed in Adam H. Fleischer & S. William Grimes, What a
Tangled Web: The New Legal Liabilities Created by the Internet, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP., Sept.
16, 1999; Cohr, Inc. v. John Doe, discussed in Greg Miller, Firm Accuses Former Executive of
Defamation on the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at C1 [hereinafter Miller, Firm Accuses
Former Executive] (discussing a suit by a corporation that publicly accused its former president
of being behind “John Doe’s” allegedly defamatory postings); Harbor Florida Bancshares, Inc.
v. John Doe, discussed in Harbor Florida Sues Internet User over Takeover Rumor, FIN. POST,
July 28, 1999, at C2 (noting that a corporation sued an anonymous John Doe “for posting false
rumors of the company’s imminent takeover”); HealthSouth Corp. v. Landry, No. 455485M
(Dist. Ct. La. 1999.) (alleging defamation of the corporation and the president of the surgery
division, Pat Foster); Hitsgalore.com v. John Does, discussed in Don Benson, Hitsgalore.com
Searches for New Life After Setbacks, BUS. PRESS, June 7, 1999, at 7 (press release) [hereinafter
Benson, Hitsgalore.com] (noting that Hitsgalore.com “announced plans to file a lawsuit against
anonymous posters on the Raging Bull and Silicon Investor online message boards” for alleg-
edly false and defamatory postings); Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8, No. 99-22831 CA 01 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Image Guided Technologies v. Surfin Rat,
discussed in Karen Auge, Firm Tries to Find ‘Net ‘Surfin Rat’, DENV. POST, Mar. 22, 1999, at B1
(alleging that John Does posted defamatory statements on Yahoo! Finance board); Itex Corp. v.
John Does # 1-100, discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (alleging that John Does posted
defamatory statements on a Yahoo! Finance board); Medphone Corp. v. DeNigris, No. 92-3785
(D.N.J. 1993) (involving a Prodigy subscriber who posted that Medphone Corporation “appears
to be a fraud” on a Money Talk bulletin board); Melvine v. Doe, No. 21942 (Va. Cir. Ct., June
24, 1999), discussed in MULTIMEDIA & WEB STRATEGIST, Aug. 1999; PacifiCorp v. John Doe,
discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (noting that the plaintiff filed a $1 million suit
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most striking features of these new cases is that, unlike most libel
suits,7 they are not even arguably about recovering money damages,
for the typical John Doe has neither deep pockets nor libel insurance
from which to satisfy a defamation judgment.8 Why, then, do plain-
against John Doe for misappropriating insider information and posting it on a Yahoo! Finance
board); Phoenix Int’l, Ltd. v. John Does, discussed in Randal, supra; Bochan v. La Fontaine,
(E.D. Va. May 26, 1999), discussed in Behnam Dayanim, Jurisdiction and Online Tortfeasors;
Out-of-State Defendants Beware, THE TEXAS LAW., Sept. 13, 1999, at 37; PhyCor v. John Does,
discussed in Cook, supra, at 30; Philip Servs. Corp. v. John Does # 1-12, discussed in Peter
Kuitenbrouwer, Philip Drops Internet Suit: Too Broke to Continue, NAT’L POST, Jan. 15, 1999,
at C8 (noting that the plaintiff corporation had dropped its defamation suit against the John
Does because the plaintiff was “too broke” to pursue it); Southern Pacific Funding Corp. v.
John Does, discussed in Woodward, supra note 5, at B5 (alleging John Does posted defamatory
statements on Yahoo! Finance board); Sykes Enterprises v. John Doe, discussed in Tampa Bay
Area, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 24, 1999, at Business & Finance 1 (alleging that a possible employee
was using a website to defame the company and one of its customers); Technical Chem. and
Prods., Inc. v. John Does 1-10, Case No. 99004548 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (alleging that John Does
used a Yahoo! message board to accuse a corporation and its officers of fraudulent and criminal
activity) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Wade Cook Fin. Corp. v. John Does # 1-10, dis-
cussed in Washington State Senate First in the Nation to Seek to Remedy Anonymous Internet
Slander, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 16, 1999, at 1 (same); Xircom Inc. v. John Doe, discussed in Laura
Randal, Web Anonymity Suits Face Obstacles, NEWSBYTES, July 26, 1999.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995) held that an ISP could be liable as the publisher of defamatory statements posted by an
unknown user on its financial bulletin board. See id. at *12. Although Stratton Oakmont in-
volved facts similar to those in the cases discussed above, this Article argues that it does not fall
into the same category as these new cases because the identity of the anonymous poster was
never revealed and because the decision in the case focused only on the liability of the ISP. See
id. In the new Internet libel cases, plaintiffs sue only the anonymous poster of the allegedly de-
famatory statements.
7. Defamation consists of two torts: libel and slander. Libel ordinarily refers to written
defamation, slander to oral defamation. See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.2, at
97 n.8 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999); infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Most of the new
John Doe cases should involve libel rather than slander because of the ability of online defama-
tion to reach a mass audience. See David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer
Information Systems and Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 91 (1993). But
see R. James George, Jr. & James A. Hemphill, Defamation Liability and the Internet, in 18TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 693, 708 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-507, 1998) (observing that no opinion has
explicitly addressed the issue and that the answer may vary according to jurisdiction).
8. Although the plaintiffs who bring Internet defamation suits often request money dam-
ages, these plaintiffs will rarely have any realistic hope of obtaining money damages. See Anne
Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amend-
ment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1645 n.16 (1995) (observing that many of those who
post abusive messages are “young users just learning their computer skills, who have little or no
financial capability to pay damages imposed by a legal judgment”); Tom Gibb, Internet Attacks
Bring Man Charges, Suit, Suspension, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 1998, at B3 (quot-
ing Duquesne University Law School’s Professor Kenneth Hirsch, who believes that the lawsuit
is less about money than about “terroriz[ing] other people who might be inclined to do the
same” thing). This feature is not unique to this new generation of Internet defamation actions.
Defamation suits are often driven by “emotion, rather than money,” since defamation actions
may be the only avenue available to vindicate a plaintiff’s damaged reputation. SANFORD, supra
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tiffs, many of whom are wealthy corporations, choose to sue relatively
impecunious John Does? The goals of this new breed of libel action
are largely symbolic,9 the primary goal being to silence John Doe and
others like him.10 This feature, standing alone, does not distinguish
these new Internet libel cases from more traditional ones.11 All libel
suits are at least partially about silencing the defendant,12 and from
the standpoint of traditional First Amendment law, there is no harm
in silencing knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact, for these
statements have no value to public discourse.13
What is unique about these new Internet suits is the threat they
pose to the new realm of discourse that has sprung up on the Internet.
The promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers ordinary
individuals with limited financial resources to “publish” their views
on matters of public concern.14 The Internet is therefore a powerful
tool for equalizing imbalances of power by giving voice to the disen-
franchised and by allowing more democratic participation in public
note 7, § 13.1, at 609 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1996-1). For further discussion of why plaintiffs
choose to sue relatively impecunious John Does, see infra Part I.D.
9. This is not to say that the plaintiffs do not have financial motives, just that they do not
hope to recover money damages. Often the suits are part of a concerted public relations cam-
paign aimed to improve the corporation’s image. For further discussion of this point, see infra
Part I.D.
10. David Osborne, a libel defendant sued by U-Haul after he described his moving expe-
riences on his U-Hell website, stated, “[U-Haul] ha[s] plenty of money. We do not. . . . If we
back down, . . . . [i]t would be liek [sic] telling any other company with huge amounts of money
that the easiest way to deal with a disgruntled customer is to threaten them into silence.” David
Osborne, The U-Hell Website, (visited June 1, 1999) <http://coyotes.org/~consumer/uhell/
lawsuit.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT 1-2 (1996) (discussing the increased use of defamation and other suits to punish
citizens for speaking out on matters of public concern). The suits discussed by Pring and Canan
differ from the suits I discuss here because a SLAPP (i.e., a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation) refers only to suits based on “communications made to influence a governmental
action.” Id. at 8. They are similar to the suits discussed here in the sense that both are brought
primarily to silence defendants for speaking out. See id. at x (labeling SLAPPs as just “one sub-
set of intimidation litigation”); see also Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on
SLAPPS: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine Years After Professors Pring and Canan First Yelled
“Fire!”, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1997); Geoffrey Paul Huling, Note, Tired of Being
Slapped Around: States Take Action Against Lawsuits Designed to Intimidate and Harass, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 401 (1994).
12. See Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 462 (“The defendant’s solvency is probably not central to the
decision to sue because the plaintiff’s reputation is at issue and thus an apology or a small re-
covery may vindicate the plaintiff.”).
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part II.B.
LIDSKY TO PRINTER2 06/22/00 3:15 PM
2000] SILENCING JOHN DOE 861
discourse.15 In other words, the Internet allows ordinary John Does to
participate as never before in public discourse, and hence, to shape
public policy.16 Yet, suits like the hypothetical John Doe suit discussed
above threaten to reestablish existing hierarchies of power, as power-
ful corporate Goliaths sue their critics for speaking their minds. De-
fendants like John Doe typically lack the resources necessary to de-
fend against a defamation action, much less the resources to satisfy a
judgment. Thus, these Internet defamation actions threaten not only
to deter the individual who is sued from speaking out, but also to en-
courage undue self-censorship among the other John Does who fre-
quent Internet discussion fora.
Although one might intuitively expect the First Amendment17 to
prevent powerful plaintiffs from silencing their critics,18 the First
Amendment extends only limited protections in such circumstances.
Beginning with the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan,19 the Supreme Court grafted numerous constitutional limita-
tions onto the structure of the defamation tort. But Sullivan and much
of its progeny involved an individual plaintiff (often a public official
or public figure) challenging statements made by a relatively powerful
media defendant.20 The First Amendment jurisprudence that devel-
15. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 91 (1948) (arguing that “[t]he unabridged freedom of public discussion is the
rock on which our government stands”).
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925) (applying the First Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
18. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: The Economic Contingency of Legal Rights?, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1163, 1164 (1995) (“Undergirding First Amendment constriction of defamation
actions has been the economics of a typical defamation action: normally, an individual plaintiff
has sued a large, corporate media entity.”).
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Prior to 1964, defamatory statements were outside the scope of the
First Amendment’s protection. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (in-
cluding defamation within the category of unprotected speech).
20. Although most libel suits are brought against the media, the “power” of the media vis-
à-vis the plaintiff should not be overstated. Most libel plaintiffs are educated and prominent
members of their communities. See Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel, in THE
COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 21, 23 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M.
Noam eds., 1989). Although Sullivan involved a relatively powerful media defendant, the jury’s
verdict in the case was $3 million, an enormous sum in 1964. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO
LAW 14 (1991). By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, libel actions threatened to si-
lence media reporting on the civil rights movement. See Sullivan, 376 U.S at 277-78 (noting that,
under state libel actions, newspapers could be faced with such large judgments that “those who
would give voice to public criticism” would be effectively silenced). Sullivan also involved sev-
eral nonmedia defendants in addition to the New York Times, and the logic of the decision ap-
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oped was therefore responsive to the culture of the institutional
press21 and its need to deliver information quickly without risking
crippling liability for minor mistakes of fact.22
It is little wonder that this same jurisprudence may not be re-
sponsive to the emerging institutional culture—or, more appropri-
ately, cultures23—of the Internet. Although Internet communications
are almost invariably “written” communications, they lack the formal
characteristics of written communications in the “real world.”24 In the
real world, the author is separated from her audience by both space
and time, and this separation interposes a formal distance between
author and audience, a distance reinforced by the conventions of writ-
ten communication. Internet communications lack this formal dis-
tance. Because communication can occur almost instantaneously, par-
ticipants in online discussions place a premium on speed.25 Indeed, in
many fora, speed takes precedence over all other values, including
plied equally to them all. Sullivan held that a public official may not recover for defamatory
statements about his conduct while in office absent a showing that the defendant published the
defamatory statements with actual malice, i.e., knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.
See id. at 279-80. Nonetheless, a recurring issue since Sullivan has been whether nonmedia
speakers receive the same protection as media speakers, suggesting that the prime concern of
the First Amendment is protection of the media. See infra Part II.C and sources cited therein;
see also, e.g., Katherine W. Pownell, Comment, Defamation and the Nonmedia Speaker, 41 FED.
COMM. L.J. 195, 197-98 (1988) (noting that, although most lower courts have extended constitu-
tional protections to nonmedia defendants when the plaintiff is a public figure or public official,
the picture is less clear when the plaintiff is a private figure).
21. In other words, one might argue that defamation has been adapted to the demands of
“print culture” rather than “Net culture.” See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyber-
spatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1684 (1995) (“Computer net-
works, interactive machines, new modes of visual communication, and hypertext expand indi-
vidual and group opportunities for working with information and, in the process, build an
environment that contrasts significantly with ‘print culture.’”). The adaptation of First Amend-
ment doctrine to print culture is logical, since “most libel suits involve the mass media, usually
newspapers.” RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 27 (1987).
22. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the
First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 579-83 (1991) (arguing that freedom of speech is
necessary to protect the wide dissemination of important information to the public).
23. This Article discusses only the culture of the financial bulletin boards. Different discus-
sion fora have different cultures, even on the Internet. As my friend and former student Re-
becca Newton Clarke has pointed out, the discussion group alt.sewing has completely different
conventions governing the range of appropriate comments than does the discussion group dis-
cussion group alt.sex. It is important for courts to take account of these varying conventions in
determining whether a statement is defamatory, since these conventions aid one in determining
how any particular comment is to be interpreted. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet: Developing a Framework for Making New
Law, in FIRST ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 11, 17-18 (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-482, 1997).
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not just accuracy but even grammar, spelling, and punctuation.26 Hy-
perbole and exaggeration are common, and “venting” is at least as
common as careful and considered argumentation.27 The fact that
many Internet speakers employ online pseudonyms28 tends to
heighten this sense that “anything goes,” and some commentators
have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the conven-
tions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.29 While this
view is undoubtedly overstated, certainly the immediacy and infor-
mality of Internet communications may be central to its widespread
appeal.
Although Internet communications may have the ephemeral
qualities of gossip with regard to accuracy,30 they are communicated
through a medium more pervasive than print, and for this reason they
have tremendous power to harm reputation.31 Once a message enters
26. See id.
27. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1645 (alluding to the facile dissemination of false in-
formation in cyberspace confrontations).
28. See id. at 1642 (noting that for some Internet users “the ability to remain unknown re-
moves many of the layers of civilized behavior as they realize that they can escape responsibility
for negligent or abusive postings”); see also ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230-32 (N.D.
Ga. 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction against a law that would restrict anonymous Inter-
net communications).
29. See, e.g., David Allweiss, Copyright Infringement on the Internet: Can the Wild, Wild
West Be Tamed?, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1005, 1005 (1999) (comparing the Internet to the old west-
ern American frontier); Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and
Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 430 (1998) (noting that the Internet
substantially increases the rate of the dissemination of information). But see Jonathan D. Bick,
Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 43 (1998) (disputing the Wild
West characterization).
30. This Article does not deal with the related issue of Internet stock manipulation. See
generally Joseph J. Cella III & John Reed Stark, Securities Regulation and the Internet, in
SECOND ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 798, 826-35 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Property No. G-520, 1998) (describing the various forms of Internet stock
manipulation and the SEC’s accompanying enforcement mechanisms); Holly C. Fontana, Secu-
rities on the Internet: World Wide Opportunity or Web of Deceit?, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 297, 312 (1998) (analyzing the “Internet’s impact on securities regulation” and particularly
its “use to facilitate fraudulent securities transactions”); John Reed Stark, Tombstones: The
Internet’s Impact upon SEC Rules of Engagement, 12 INSIGHTS 10, 11 (1998) (discussing how the
Internet can be used to create false “buzz” about a company to manipulate its market value);
David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot See: Securities Regulation on
the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 612, 627-30 (1998) (addressing securities fraud on the
Internet).
31. Michael Hadley makes a convincing argument on this point in one of the best notes on
the topic of Internet defamation. See Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet
Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477 (1998).
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cyberspace, millions of people worldwide can gain access to it.32 Even
if the message is posted in a discussion forum frequented by only a
handful of people, any one of them can republish the message by
printing it or, as is more likely, by forwarding it instantly to a different
discussion forum. And if the message is sufficiently provocative, it
may be republished again and again.33 The extraordinary capacity of
the Internet to replicate almost endlessly any defamatory message
lends credence to the notion that “the truth rarely catches up with a
lie.”34 The problem for libel law,35 then, is how to protect reputation
without squelching the potential of the Internet as a medium of public
discourse. This Article attempts to solve this problem and, in the pro-
32. See Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1996) (“In cyberspace, the
power to defame is unprecedented.”).
33. The extraordinary persistence of certain Internet rumors illustrates this point. See
Hadley, supra note 31, at 495 (discussing a “bizarre hoax that flooded thousands of e-mail
boxes” and misattributed a graduation speech to Kurt Vonnegut). An Internet rumor that the
clothing designer Tommy Hilfiger had insulted African-Americans during an interview on
Oprah Winfrey’s show reached millions of people, despite the fact that Hilfiger never appeared
on the show, much less made the remarks attributed to him. See Designer Hilfiger Disputes Net
Rumors of Racism, USA TODAY TECH. REP. (visited Jan. 21, 2000)
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cta109.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Furthermore, the rumor persisted long after it had been refuted, and even now many Internet
users may not know that it has been debunked.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974); accord Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is the rare case where the de-
nial overtakes the original charge.”).
35. A product disparagement action (also known as an action for injurious falsehood) is
very similar to a libel action. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 962-63 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that the tort of injurious falsehood is
known by many other names, including “slander of goods” and “trade libel”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (using the term “injurious
falsehood”). The Restatement states that an action for “injurious falsehood” arises when a
speaker “publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another” that causes pecuniary
losses to the other and the speaker (a) “intends for publication of the statement to result in
harm . . . or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so,” and (b) the speaker
“knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.”
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 623A; accord KEETON ET AL., supra, § 128, at 964 (noting the difficul-
ties of distinguishing between “personal defamation of the plaintiff on the one hand and dispar-
agement of his property on the other”); Lisa Magee Arent, A Matter of “‘Governing’ Impor-
tance”: Providing Business Defamation and Product Disparagement Defendants Full First
Amendment Protection, 67 IND. L.J. 441, 445 (1992) (arguing that the same constitutional stan-
dards should be applied to both business defamation and product disparagement actions); Arlen
W. Langvardt, Free Speech Versus Economic Harm: Accommodating Defamation, Commercial
Speech, and Unfair Competition Considerations in the Law of Injurious Falsehood, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 903, 904 (1989) (noting that business defamation actions are designed to protect reputa-
tion, whereas disparagement (or injurious falsehood) actions protect only economic interests).
Although the analysis offered in this Article responds specifically to libel actions, it should be
equally applicable to product disparagement actions.
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cess, to assess the proper role for defamation law in “civilizing” dis-
course in cyberspace.
Part I examines a perplexing feature of the new Internet libel
suits: why do plaintiffs wish to sue John Doe when they can have no
hope of recovery? As this part argues, plaintiffs find bringing suit
worthwhile because of the distinctive nature of libel actions, which
allows plaintiffs to pursue symbolic goals regardless of any monetary
award. Yet, while it might be tempting to characterize all of these new
suits as Internet SLAPPs (i.e., Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Par-
ticipation)36 brought by plaintiffs solely to harass and to silence their
critics, this characterization ignores the power that the Internet gives
irresponsible speakers to damage the reputations of their targets and
underestimates the potential benefits that defamation law may bring
to Internet discourse.
Part II argues that, despite the potential benefit, strict applica-
tion of existing law threatens to chill unduly the ordinary John Does
who frequent online discussion fora and, by doing so, threatens the
Internet’s promise as a medium for revitalizing the “marketplace of
ideas”37 metaphor that lies at the heart of First Amendment theory.
Part II appraises John Doe’s contribution to public discourse and
concludes that it warrants substantial, though not unlimited, First
Amendment “breathing space” to guarantee its survival.
Existing First Amendment protections, however, are inadequate
to prevent corporations from intimidating John Doe into silence, at
least so long as these protections do not recognize the unique culture
of the Internet message boards. Part III therefore contends that the
constitutional privilege for nonfactual expression (the “opinion
privilege”) may be a viable defense against the use of defamation law
to silence John Doe, but only if courts are willing to adapt the privi-
lege to the unique social context of cyberspace. The Article concludes
with a plea for the Supreme Court to remedy the deficits in its defa-
mation jurisprudence and gives practical guidance to lower courts
that wish to protect John Doe in the likely event that this plea goes
unheeded.
36. For a discussion of SLAPPs, see supra note 11.
37. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (discussing the origins and significance
of the phrase).
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I. SUING JOHN DOE
It is easy to portray the recent rash of libel actions against Inter-
net users38 as David versus Goliath battles, or even perhaps as Inter-
net SLAPP suits, used by big corporations to intimidate their critics
into silence. After all, these suits almost inevitably involve wealthy
and powerful plaintiffs suing anonymous individuals for speaking out
on matters of public interest. However, upon closer examination, this
characterization is too facile to capture the complex issues raised by
these new suits.
A. HealthSouth v. Krum and the New Internet Libel Cases
Consider the case of HealthSouth Corp. v. John Doe,39 which
later became HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum.40 There could hardly be a
less sympathetic John Doe defendant than Peter Krum. Peter Krum
was a disgruntled former employee of HealthSouth,41 a publicly
traded corporation that operates rehabilitative health care facilities.42
Posting under the name “I AM DIRK DIGGLER,” a reference to
38. In addition to the John Doe suits that are the focus of this Article, libel suits also have
arisen over “gripe sites”—sites in which customers, students, former employees, business associ-
ates, and others vent their grievances on a website. See, e.g., Eric Bailey, California and the
West: Feud with Officer Pursued Online, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A3 (discussing a suit
brought by a police officer against a woman who, having been jailed for speeding, later posted
allegedly defamatory statements on a website); Kathleen Parrish, Teacher Sues Boy, Parents,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Nov. 6, 1998, at B1 (discussing a defamation suit brought by a
teacher against a student and his parents for derogatory remarks posted on the student’s web-
site); Robert Trigaux, Web Sites Aid Let Consumers Publicly Vent Gripes Against Companies,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, KRTBUS
File (discussing a suit brought by U-Haul against a disgruntled customer who complained about
U-Haul on a website). The U-Hell Website details U-Haul’s lawsuit against U-Hell’s creator. See
Osborne, supra note 10.
Yet, other libel suits arise when someone appropriates a plaintiff’s online identity and
posts hostile messages to others. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (involving a Boy Scout who sued after “John Doe 1” posted a “‘vile and ob-
scene’ e-mail message in the name of the plaintiff”); Jay Croft, Lawsuit Alleges Cyberlibel,
ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 5, 1999, at B1 (stating that plaintiff Ronald Attkisson filed suit against a
former employee, Scott Gerstein, who had created a “bogus profile to make . . . postings” on
Yahoo! message boards that would be attributed to the plaintiff). These “appropriation of iden-
tity” suits present a set of concerns different from the ones I shall be discussing above, since the
only possible motivation of the defendant was to harm the person whose identity was appropri-
ated.
39. See HealthSouth Files Libel Suit for Statements Made on Web, SUNDAY PATRIOT-
NEWS, Nov. 1, 1998, at B5 [hereinafter HealthSouth Files Libel Suit].
40. Complaint, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County, filed
Oct. 28, 1998).
41. See Cook, supra note 6.
42. See Complaint ¶ 6, HealthSouth Corp.
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the well-endowed porn star in the 1997 movie Boogie Nights,43 Krum
verbally savaged HealthSouth, its CEO Richard Scrushy, and even
Scrushy’s wife, Leslie, on a Yahoo! Finance message board dedicated
to discussion of the corporation.44 Krum’s postings ranged from rela-
tively innocuous statements about HealthSouth’s “self-serving” man-
agement45 to accusations that Richard Scrushy was “bilking . . .
[M]edicare reimbursement.”46 The most egregious postings by Krum
were those that discussed, in salacious detail, an affair “I AM DIRK
DIGGLER” was allegedly having with Leslie Scrushy.47 Krum, for
example, wrote, “I am dirk diggler and I have what [Richard] Scrushy
wants. Too bad I keep giving it to his new wife . . . [and] [a]s for those
of you who disapprove of my crowing about sexual liasons [sic] with
Dick’s wife, lighten up. I’m practicing safe sex.”48 Krum seemed to
relent from his vicious attacks at one point, stating that he would be
“‘toning down’”49 his statements because he “felt blessed” that his
wife was expecting.50 Yet, just a week later, Krum was back to his old
tricks,51 which ultimately prompted HealthSouth to sue for libel and
commercial disparagement and Richard and Leslie Scrushy to sue for
libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress.52
There is no real question that the statements at issue in Krum
were at least facially defamatory. A defamatory statement is a false
statement that harms or tends to harm53 an individual’s reputation in
43. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Krum “purposely chose[] as his screen name ‘I AM
DIRK DIGGLER,’ thereby intending to reflect the persona of a violent, amoral, and sexually
aggressive drug addict from the recent and popular movie ‘Boogie Nights.’” Id. ¶ 10. An alter-
native explanation might be that Krum chose that screen-name to imply that he was similarly
well-endowed.
44. See id. ¶¶ 3-4.
45. Id. ¶ 13.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See Gibb, supra note 8.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 559 cmt. d (“To be defamatory, it is not necessary
that the communication actually cause harm to another’s reputation or deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him. Its character depends upon its general tendency to have such an
effect.”). The abstract nature of this inquiry into the “tendencies” of words is related to the
defamation doctrine of presumed damages. See David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation,
and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 751 (1984) (criticizing the doctrine of presumed dam-
ages); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (1996) (explaining that, under the doctrine of presumed damages, “[i]f the
court finds that the statement [has] the tendency to harm reputation, the plaintiff may recover
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the eyes of his community.54 Accusations of dishonesty, criminality,
and adultery are prototypical defamatory statements.55 The real issue
raised by the case is what the plaintiffs hoped to gain by suing “I AM
DIRK DIGGLER.” HealthSouth operates almost two thousand re-
habilitation centers in the United States,56 Australia, and the United
Kingdom, with recent annual revenues in the billions.57 Its CEO,
Richard Scrushy, makes $13 million a year.58 Even before Yahoo! re-
vealed Krum’s identity, the plaintiffs could have had no expectation
that “I AM DIRK DIGGLER” would have the resources necessary
to satisfy a defamation judgment. As it turned out, Krum was a food-
service worker at Penn State University, who lost his job (and his an-
nual salary of $35,000) once the plaintiffs filed their suit.59 Thus, even
if one concedes, as one must, that Peter Krum was an embittered and
malicious former employee engaged in what might be thought of as a
new form of industrial sabotage, it is not entirely clear what Health-
South stood to gain by suing him.
B. The Practical Effect of Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act
Obviously, plaintiffs would prefer to sue defendants with deeper
pockets than John Does typically have. Indeed, the first generation of
Internet libel actions sought to impose liability on Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) for defamatory messages posted by their subscrib-
ers.60 ISPs are logical targets for defamation suits. Suing the ISP frees
substantial damages without any proof whatsoever of actual harm”). See generally KEETON ET
AL., supra note 35, § 111, at 774, 780-83 (providing examples of statements that have been found
either defamatory or nondefamatory, based on “whether the words are reasonably capable of a
particular interpretation”).
54. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 559 (defining a defamatory statement as one that
“harm[s] the reputation of another [so] as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or . . . deter[s] third persons from associating or dealing with him”).
55. See SANFORD, supra note 7, § 4.13, at 132.11 to 132.14 (2d ed. 1991) (listing “red flag”
words likely to trigger defamation suits).
56. See Gibb, supra note 8 (1800 centers); HealthSouth Files Libel Suit, supra note 39 (2000
centers).
57. See Gibb, supra note 8 ($2.8 billion); HealthSouth Files Libel Suit, supra note 39 ($3
billion).
58. See Oliver August, WorldCom Chief Gets Pounds 10M for MCI Deal, TIMES (London),
Apr. 25, 1998, at 27.
59. See Moss, supra note 4.
60. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995). Stratton Oakmont was not the first Internet libel action, but it was the first decision
that posed any realistic threat of imposing liability on ISPs based on content posted by third par-
ties. The facts of Stratton Oakmont are almost identical to the facts of the John Doe suits dis-
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cussed above. Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment firm, and its president, Daniel Porush,
sued for libel after an unknown user of a financial bulletin board made vague accusations that
the plaintiffs had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with an initial public
stock offering. See id. at *1 (alleging that the poster defamed plaintiff by alleging that the IPO
was a “major criminal fraud” and a “100% criminal fraud,” that the president of Stratton Oak-
mont was “soon to be proven criminal,” and that the firm was a “cult of brokers who either lie
for a living or get fired”). The John Doe in Stratton Oakmont evidently used a former em-
ployee’s access code to post the message. See Robert B. Charles & Jacob H. Zamansky, Liabil-
ity for Online Libel After Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 28 CONN. L. REV.
1173, 1189 n.68 (1996).
Despite the factual similarities, however, the Stratton Oakmont decision teaches little
about how to resolve the John Doe cases. The key issue in Stratton Oakmont, which was decided
on a motion for partial summary judgment, was whether Prodigy was a “publisher” or a “dis-
tributor” for purposes of defamation liability. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1. A
second issue was whether its bulletin board moderator, who was also a defendant in the suit, was
its agent for purposes of defamation liability. See id. “Publisher” and “distributor” are terms of
art in defamation law. At common law, a publisher would be strictly liable not only for origi-
nating a defamatory statement but also for repeating or otherwise republishing a third party’s
defamatory statements. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 578. A distributor, on the other
hand, would be liable only for “distributing” the defamatory communications of third parties if
the distributor knew or had reason to know of the defamatory content. See id. § 581 (“[O]ne
who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to li-
ability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”). The reason
for the distinction was simple. Publishers, like newspapers and broadcasters, have complete edi-
torial control over the material they publish, and therefore it is fair to hold them liable for it.
Distributors, such as bookstores, libraries, and newsstands, have no practical ability to monitor
every publication they distribute, and it is therefore unfair to impose liability absent notice of
defamatory content and some type of fault. See generally id. § 581 cmts. d, e, f & g. Because the
facts of Stratton Oakmont suggested at most negligence on the part of the ISP, the plaintiff
needed the court to treat the ISP as a publisher in order to have any hope of recovery. But the
problem for the Stratton Oakmont court, and for the two other courts that had dealt with the
issue, was that ISPs do not fit neatly into defamation’s traditional categories. See Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that an ISP that exercised
no editorial control over the online newsletter in which the allegedly defamatory statements ap-
peared should not be held liable as the “publisher” of the defamatory statement). See generally
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 581 cmts. d, e, f & g (describing news dealers, bookstores, li-
braries, telegraph companies, and radio and television broadcasters as those capable of trans-
mitting defamatory material); SANFORD, supra note 7, § 2.4, at 48.14 (2d ed. 1991) (acknowl-
edging the difficulty of distinguishing between the “‘publisher/republisher/distributor/common
carrier’ designation”); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT.
L. REV. 993, 1001 (1994) (noting the difficulty of applying traditional analogies to resolve Inter-
net defamation cases). Some ISPs exercise a fair amount of editorial control, others exercise
almost none, and still others exercise control in only some fora. The Stratton Oakmont court
therefore deemed it appropriate to examine the degree of editorial control exercised by Prodigy
in the case at hand rather than to adopt a categorical rule for ISPs. Applying this approach, the
court found that Prodigy should be treated as a publisher rather than as a distributor. See Strat-
ton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. Unlike other ISPs, which do not purport to exercise con-
trol over the content they provide to subscribers, Prodigy explicitly marketed itself as a “‘family
oriented’ computer service” based at least in part on its policy of censoring bulletin board mes-
sages for offensive content. Id. Moreover, the court stressed, Prodigy not only used screening
software to delete offensive messages; it also “created an editorial staff of Board Leaders who
have the ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact do spend time cen-
soring notes.” Id. The court therefore held that, although ISPs should normally be categorized
as distributors, Prodigy’s “own policies, technology and staffing decisions . . . have altered the
scenario and mandated the finding that it is a publisher.” Id.
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plaintiffs from having to discover the identity of the person who
posted the message, and ISPs have plenty of money to satisfy defama-
tion judgments.61 Moreover, ISPs have at least some of the character-
istics of a traditional publisher, including, in some cases, the ability to
edit content supplied by a third party. Logical or not, Congress
largely foreclosed access to these deep-pocket defendants when it
passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).62
Subsection 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an inter-
active computer service63 shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content pro-
61. See David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 174-75
(1997) (listing “the most significant players in the game [as] AOL, a publicly owned company
with a market value of $6.5 million; Prodigy . . . ; and Microsoft Network, which is owned by Mi-
crosoft Corp., a company with a market value of $148 billion”). In addition to guaranteeing a
deep-pocket defendant, any judgment the plaintiffs received would have signaled ISPs to con-
trol carefully the contents posted on their message boards.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III 1999). The CDA is Title V (§§ 501-09) of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996. See Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.). Section 230 was at least partially a
response to the perceived threat to Internet discourse posed by the first generation of Internet
libel suits, and more specifically to the threat posed by Stratton Oakmont, which is discussed
more extensively supra note 60. The problem with the Stratton Oakmont decision (at least as
some members of Congress saw it) was that it protects ISPs that take no steps to curb offensive
or defamatory content, and it penalizes ISPs like Prodigy that try to curb offensive and defama-
tory content but fail. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.S.C.A.N. 124, 207-08 (suggesting that the CDA was meant to overturn the Stratton Oak-
mont decision). Based on a formalistic application of defamation law, the Stratton Oakmont de-
cision makes sense. Increased editorial control brings with it the responsibility to monitor for
defamatory content, and therefore it is fair to impose liability on those ISPs that, like Prodigy,
choose to exercise editorial control. Of course, this reasoning ignores the fact that an ISP that
has the same ability to exercise editorial control as Prodigy but chooses not to will be treated as
a distributor. Presumably, as the court noted, the benefit Prodigy receives from customers who
choose its service because it exercises editorial control offsets the detriment of being treated as
a publisher for defamation purposes. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in
Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Fron-
tier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1115-33 (1996) (suggesting that in the wake of the Stratton Oakmont
decision, ISPs should “abdicate responsibility” to avoid liability). But see Douglas B. Luftman,
Note, Defamation Liability for On-Line Services: The Sky Is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1071, 1073 (1997) (“[I]f on-line services heed the commentators’ warnings and stop exert-
ing editorial control over their on-line services, the general public’s refusal to tolerate disorgan-
ized virtual environments will lead to stagnation, which ultimately can devastate the on-line
services industry.”).
63. The CDA of 1996 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information serv-
ice, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (Supp. III 1999). America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy, which oper-
ate bulletin boards, are typical examples.
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vider.”64 Despite the broad wording of subsection (c)(1), the title of
the subsection (c) suggests that its purpose is to protect “Good Sa-
maritans,” as the Act dubbed them,65 by shielding them from liability
when they attempt to censor offensive material66 on the Internet.
Both the title of the Act and its legislative history suggest that
Congress meant to establish a policy that ISPs would not be subject to
liability as “publishers” of content posted by third parties just because
they exercise a limited degree of editorial control over content.67 But
court decisions interpreting subsection 230(c) have broadened its am-
bit far beyond merely protecting “Good Samaritan” editorial control.
As interpreted, section 230 gives ISPs complete immunity from liabil-
ity for defamatory content initiated by third parties, even if the ISP
consciously decides to republish the defamatory content.68 The practi-
64. Id. § 230(c)(1). Subsection 230(c)(2) further provided as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content provid-
ers or others the technical means to restrict access to materials described in
paragraph (1).
65. Subsection (c) is entitled “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material.” Id. § 230(c).
66. See id.
67. A logical corollary might be that ISPs should get the benefit of the more beneficial dis-
tributor standard. See James B. Speta, Internet Theology, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 227, 230-31 (1999)
(“[T]he [CDA] and legislative history can be read to limit [section 230(c)(1)’s] exemption to
Internet service providers that do no more than provide access services (i.e., dumb pipes) . . . .”).
But see Luftman, supra note 62, at 1074 n.22 (noting that the language of the Act “does not ad-
dress restrictions on access to libelous material” and that the focus of the Act was to protect
screening for sexual materials). Unfortunately, this interpretation has not held sway.
68. In Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998), for example, the court ruled
that Congress had expressly granted immunity to ISPs, including those “aggressive[ly] . . . mak-
ing available content prepared by others.” Id. at 52. And in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998),
a district court held that ISPs are immune from defamation liability under the CDA for failing
to remove defamatory content posted by a third party, even after the ISP has been notified of
the defamatory content. See id. at 1137. In Doe v. America Online, Inc., 1997 WL 374223 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. June 26, 1997), the plaintiffs asserted a variety of claims against AOL for failing to pre-
vent its service from being used to market child pornography, even after AOL was “on notice”
of the criminal use of its services. See id. at *1. The pornographic materials at issue contained
images of the minor plaintiff taken when he was only 11 years old. See id. at *2-3. Although the
plaintiffs sought to hold AOL liable as a distributor rather than as a publisher, the Florida cir-
cuit court followed Zeran in holding that all of plaintiff’s claims were barred by section 230 of
the CDA. See id. at *4 (“[T]o hold AOL liable for negligently ‘distributing’ . . . chat room
statements, as Doe seeks, would treat AOL as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of those statements in
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cal effect of these interpretations of section 230 of the CDA is to
leave Internet defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue. The de-
famed plaintiff can no longer sue the intermediary who republished a
defamatory communication. Instead, the plaintiff must go to the
source and sue the person who originated the defamatory communi-
cation, even if that person is an unknown John Doe.
C. The Nonmonetary Benefits of Libel Actions
Thus, one answer to the question of why sue John Doe is that he
is the only person left to sue.69 But this is an inadequate answer. Most
tort actions will never be pursued if it is clear that the potential de-
fendant lacks the resources to satisfy a judgment.70 Most plaintiffs do
not have the money to litigate based on principle,71 and, even in con-
tingency-fee cases most plaintiffs’ attorneys realize that 33% (the
typical contingency fee) of zero is still zero.72
The sudden surge in John Doe suits stems from the fact that
many defamation actions are not really about money.73 If they were,
the tremendous obstacles to recovery would almost certainly make
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) conclude that the game was not worth
the candle. Defamation plaintiffs often find their suits derailed at the
very early stages, with never so much as a mention of the First
violation of section 230.”). The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s analysis. See Doe v.
America Online, Inc. 718 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the CDA im-
munized AOL from being held liable as a “distributor” of child pornography), rev. granted, 729
So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1999).
69. See Greg Miller, “John Doe” Suits Threaten Internet Users’ Anonymity, L.A. TIMES,
June 14, 1999, at A1 (“Companies that file the ‘John Doe’ suits say the tactic is one of their few
weapons against what they consider digital defamation.”).
70. Whence arises the adage that I learned in law school: “You can’t get blood from a tur-
nip.”
71. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 69 (stating that 73% of libel plaintiffs use a
contingency fee arrangement to pursue their libel actions).
72. As one group of researchers noted, many conventional analyses of legal problems rest
on three assumptions:
[F]irst, that parties to a dispute are motivated chiefly by money; second, that the par-
ties’ actions are based on economically rational decisions about financial risks, costs,
and benefits of recovery in litigation; and third, that negotiation and litigation are
governed by an economic calculus shaped by the doctrines and rules of liability within
the formal legal system.
Bezanson et al., supra note 20, at 21. Libel litigation often defies the “conventional expectations
of economic rationality.” Id. at 22.
73. Or, rather, they are not really about recovering money damages, which is a different
issue. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.74 The common law elements of defamation,75 which have
been set for centuries,76 remain “filled with technicalities and traps for
the unwary.”77 A plaintiff must begin her suit by proving, at a mini-
mum,78 that the defendant made a defamatory communication about
the plaintiff to a third party.79 What she must prove next depends on
whether the communication was communicated orally or whether it
was written. If the defamation was oral (i.e., slanderous), the plaintiff
will have to prove that the defendant’s slander caused her economic
or pecuniary loss, unless the slanderous allegation falls into one of the
four narrowly defined categories of slander per se.80 If the defamation
was written (i.e., libelous), the plaintiff ordinarily does not have to
prove that it caused her any economic loss, unless the defamatory
meaning was not obvious from the statement itself.81 Even if a plain-
74. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS
MEDIA LAW 196 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that, because many defamation cases are defeated by
state law defenses, federal law issues are never raised).
75. It is important to note that defamation is a tort and that therefore states may vary in
defining it. For an example of an unusual state variation, see the Illinois “innocent construction”
rule, discussed in Barter v. Wilson, 512 N.E.2d 816, 818-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). I attempt here to
give merely a thumbnail sketch of the typical obstacles a defamation plaintiff must face in order
to recover.
76. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 1 (noting that libel “is largely judge-made (or
common law) in origin”). For a history of defamation, see generally R.C. Donnelly, History of
Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99; Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904).
77. David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1285 (1942).
78. See ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 2.1, at 63 (2d ed. 1994) (“It was once standard operating procedure to begin a dis-
cussion of the law of defamation by stating the elements of a cause of action for libel and slan-
der. That is no longer easy, not since the Supreme Court ‘constitutionalized’ the torts.”).
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 558 (listing the elements as modified by constitu-
tional law); DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 147 (2d ed. 1981) (listing the common law
elements). At common law, the defendant was strictly liable for publishing defamatory state-
ments, and the falsity of the underlying statement was presumed. See KEETON ET AL., supra
note 35, § 116, at 839. Today, the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove fault and falsity
in almost all cases. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
80. Defamatory communications causing pecuniary harm constitute “special harm.” See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 575 cmt. b (defining special harm as “the loss of something
having economic or pecuniary value”). The plaintiff must prove special damages unless the oral
communication was “slanderous per se,” that is to say, unless it consisted of (1) allegations that
the plaintiff had engaged in criminal behavior, (2) allegations that the plaintiff had contracted a
“loathsome disease,” (3) allegations that would injure the plaintiff in his “trade, business, pro-
fession, or office,” or (4) allegations that the plaintiff was unchaste, although this category tradi-
tionally applied only to female plaintiffs. SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2.7.2, at 129-30.
81. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 218 (noting that some states do not re-
quire proof of special damages if a statement is libelous, but that others states require plaintiffs
to prove special damages if the defamatory meaning is not obvious on the face of the state-
ment). A statement that is defamatory on its face is deemed “libelous per se.” For an explana-
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tiff is able to prove the elements of her case, she must still overcome a
host of common law privileges designed to protect reports of govern-
ment meetings,82 job recommendations,83 and other types of speech
deemed worthy of extra protection from defamation liability.84
In the unlikely event that the plaintiff makes it past the high bar-
riers posed by tort law, First Amendment obstacles will prove almost
insurmountable.85 What these obstacles are depends on a number of
factors: the identity of the plaintiff, the identity of the defendant, and
the type of speech at issue.86 Public officials and public figures must
prove that the defendant’s statements were false and that they were
made intentionally or with reckless disregard of their falsity, at least
where the speech at issue deals with a matter of public concern.87 Pri-
vate figures face a different set of requirements. Private figures suing
for speech on a matter of public concern must prove falsity88 and neg-
tion of the differences between slander and libel and the confusion engendered by the terms
libel per se and slander per se, see SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2.7.3, at 132-33.
82. The “fair and accurate report” privilege and its justifications are discussed extensively
in Medico v. Time Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally DAVID A. ELDER, THE FAIR
REPORT PRIVILEGE (1988) (explaining the rationale, requirements, and applicability of the fair
report privilege).
83. A version of this privilege is codified in the California Civil Code, which provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . . [i]n a communication, without
malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one
who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable
ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is
requested by the person interested to give the information.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
84. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 1-2 (“The [common law] privileges were de-
signed to protect expression in settings of special importance . . . .”). See generally FRANKLIN &
ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 221-24 (discussing the common law privileges).
85. I refer here to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but it is impor-
tant to note that state constitutional law may also impose limits on defamation actions. See, e.g.,
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994) (construing Article I, Section 15
of the Utah Constitution as giving a state constitutional right to express one’s opinion, thereby
“circumscrib[ing] the reach of state defamation law”); see also JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES ¶ 5.06
(1993) (surveying cases in which state constitutional provisions for freedom of expression were
invoked to defend defamation actions); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and
State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 178 (1984) (arguing that states should first decide whether
state law is violated before looking to federal law).
86. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic
Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1547, 1567-70 (1987); see also
SACK & BARON, supra note 78, § 2 at 63 (noting that “the jurisdiction whose law applies” is also
a crucial factor in determining the requirements for a cause of action).
87. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 726 (1964).
88. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
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ligence (at least) on the part of the defendant in order to recover.89
Private figures suing for speech on private matters may not face any
First Amendment hurdles,90 but the Supreme Court’s decisions make
at least one thing clear: truly private figure/private concern cases are
likely to be few and far between.91 As if these obstacles were not
enough, a host of other constitutional privileges for hyperbole,92 sat-
ire,93 and the like stand as independent obstacles to recovery.94
Empirical studies confirm that the practical effect of these laby-
rinthine doctrines is to make it almost impossible for any plaintiff to
succeed in a defamation action.95 Statistics show that only 13% of
plaintiffs ultimately prevail in libel litigation,96 and, as one commenta-
tor has observed, the few plaintiffs who do prevail owe more to good
fortune than “to their virtue, their skill, or the justice of their cause.”97
However, even these grim statistics do not indicate that it is always
economically irrational to sue for defamation; after all, defamation
89. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court has never decided
whether the Gertz requirements apply to nonmedia defendants. As a practical matter, many
private plaintiffs will still choose to prove actual malice in order to obtain presumed and puni-
tive damages. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487,
502 (1991).
90. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985)
(plurality) (holding that private plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive damages without
proof of actual malice). Justice White noted in his concurrence that “[i]t must be that the Gertz
requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such
as this.” Id. at 774 (White, J., concurring). The Supreme Court, however, never explicitly
adopted this position.
91. See, e.g., id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the lack of a consensus in
the plurality opinion indicates that the case should be restricted to its rather peculiar facts).
92. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1990); Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 264-65 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 6 (1970); infra Part III.A-B.
93. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46-47 (1988) (holding that public
officials cannot recover damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of the publication of a caricature without a showing of actual malice).
94. See, e.g., Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (1990) (reading the Court’s prior cases as providing
constitutional protection for “statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating ac-
tual facts’ about an individual” (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50)).
95. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 3, 239-40 (concluding, after analyzing almost
every reported defamation case decided between 1974 and 1984 and conducting surveys of libel
plaintiffs and libel defendants, that “[t]hose who bring suit confront a frustrating obstacle
course, and they almost always lose”).
96. See id. at 119. The figure for public figure corporations was even more grim: they suc-
ceeded in just 5% of cases. See id. A similar study of cases decided between January 1976 and
mid-June 1979 suggested that in suits against nonmedia defendants, plaintiffs prevailed in only
12% of cases, and against media defendants in only 5%. See Franklin, supra note 12, at 476.
97. SACK & BARON, supra note 78, at xxix (from Sack’s preface to the first edition).
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verdicts reach millions of dollars,98 which may be large enough to
make it worthwhile to gamble on a large recovery.99
But the slim chance of a damages award does not explain why
plaintiffs sue in most defamation cases,100 and it certainly cannot ex-
plain why plaintiffs sue in Internet libel cases. Instead, what the evi-
dence suggests is that libel plaintiffs often sue because they believe
that the social and psychological benefits of suing make it worthwhile,
even if they never recover a money judgment from the defamer.101
Plaintiffs often seek vindication, and bringing suit provides a means—
perhaps the only means available—to announce to the world that the
defendants’ statements were false.102 On the other hand, plaintiffs may
be seeking an even simpler goal: they may just want the defamation
to stop, and a defamation suit is the only legal tool available to ac-
complish this goal. Thus, to say that the new Internet libel suits are
brought for symbolic goals is not necessarily pejorative, particularly
when a symbolic victory is the only kind available.
D. Why Corporations Sue John Doe
This symbolic aspect of bringing a defamation action is particu-
larly evident in the John Doe cases, although corporate plaintiffs may
be seeking a symbolic victory partially for financial reasons.103 Many
of these actions appear to be brought as merely one tool in a con-
certed public relations campaign. Corporations often issue press re-
98. See FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 340 (asserting that an examination of
libel cases from the 1980s reveals that the median jury award was $200,000, but the average
award was $1.5 million).
99. See Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1167, 1167-68 (1995) (arguing that, while individual plaintiffs may sue for emo-
tional or psychological reasons, corporations usually bring libel suits for business reasons).
100. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 28 (“The role money plays in plaintiffs’ deci-
sion to sue for libel is complex. . . . [I]t does not appear to be the case that most libel plaintiffs
see their suit principally as an opportunity to profit at the expense of the media.”).
101. See id. at 162 (concluding that libel plaintiffs believe that they win by suing, because
“[t]he act of suing, itself, represents a public and official form of response and denial, legitimat-
ing the plaintiff’s claim of falsity”); see also David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defama-
tion Costs: The Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1208 (1995) (“One of
the things that distinguishes defamation litigation from most commercial litigation is the extent
to which noneconomic motives (i.e., motives other than to receive compensation for economic
loss caused by the alleged breach of duty) are operative.”).
102. In traditional libel suits, plaintiffs’ primary goals in bringing suit include restoring repu-
tation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and exacting vengeance. See Randall P. Bezan-
son, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV.
226, 227 (1985).
103. See Redlich, supra note 99, at 1168.
LIDSKY TO PRINTER2 06/22/00 3:15 PM
2000] SILENCING JOHN DOE 877
leases announcing their decision to sue those who post on financial
bulletin boards,104 even though doing so gives more widespread pub-
licity to the defendants’ remarks than they received at the time they
were posted.105 The tendency to publicize the decision to file suit may
be partly a function of the economic motivations that drive corporate
plaintiffs to sue. Although corporations that sue John Doe may never
recover money damages, they may still deem it economically rational
to sue the pseudonymous posters who make negative statements
about them on financial message boards. Corporate plaintiffs are at
least partly motivated by the fear that negative statements on finan-
cial bulletin boards will drive down their stock price.106 The stock
market trades on information, and negative information shifts stock
prices very quickly.107 Hence, corporations must act quickly to offset
the potentially negative effects of defamatory messages by offering an
alternative version of events.108 Indeed, failure to respond may itself
be deemed an admission that the negative statements are true. Suing
John Doe, as it turns out, is good for business to the extent that it
104. See, e.g., Americare Health Scan Files Libel Suit Against TCPI and Individuals over
Anonymous Yahoo! Postings, supra note 6 (reporting the filing of a libel suit based on unsub-
stantiated allegations of personal and professional wrongdoing); Business Wire Files Suit for
Fraud & Trademark Violations, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BWIRE File (reporting on a lawsuit alleging that three individuals used Business Wire’s press
release distribution service to publicize a fraudulent investment opportunity); Technical Chemi-
cals & Products, Inc., Technical Chemicals & Products Files Defamation Lawsuit Against On-
Line Posters (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.031799/
190761222.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
105. It is for this reason that lawyers traditionally have cautioned plaintiffs that pursuing an
action for defamation may cause more harm than good, since it republishes the allegedly libel-
ous statements to a different audience. See, e.g., Redlich, supra note 99, at 1176 (advising corpo-
rations contemplating suing for defamation to consider the harm that may arise from repub-
lishing the defamatory statements).
106. See Moss, supra note 4 (discussing HealthSouth’s attempt to sue anonymous detractors
on its Yahoo! message board for defamation).
107. According to the efficient capital market hypothesis, new information about a security
will immediately be reflected in its market price, and “any change in a security’s price must be
the result of new and unforeseen information (either about the security or the state of the world
generally).” WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 392 (6th ed. 1996); see also Redlich, supra note 99, at 1169:
Of particular importance to a publicly held corporation is a defamation’s impact upon
financial markets. A defamation may lead to a dramatic drop in the market value of a
company’s stock. Moreover, since corporate transactions are often directly dependent
on stock values, the consequential impact of a drop in share values can be enormous.
108. See Redlich, supra note 99, at 1170 (observing that corporations may engage in “media
campaigns” to refute defamatory accusations).
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sends a message to shareholders that the corporation is stable and
strong.109
It may be no coincidence, then, that some corporations decide to
bring suit for Internet libel when they are already taking a beating in
the market for unrelated reasons. The chronology of Hitsgalore.com’s
decision to file a libel action,110 for example, seems somewhat suspect.
Hitsgalore.com, Inc., is an Internet company that provides a “busi-
ness-to-business Web portal and search engine.”111 In 1998, Hitsga-
lore.com had a reported revenue of less than $10,000.112 In March of
1999,113 Hitsgalore.com entered a “reverse merger”114 with another
company to become a publicly traded over-the-counter (“OTC”) se-
curity on the OTC Bulletin Board.115 The move was a stunning suc-
cess. Due to investor enchantment with Internet stocks,116 the market
109. These suits may be part of a broader trend. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a),
Commercial Falsehood, and the First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV.
309, 310 (1993) (“Business entities have become increasingly inclined in recent years to institute
litigation as a means of vindicating corporate reputation or economic interests when false
statements have been made about their products, services, or commercial activities.”).
110. See Complaint, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D. Fla. filed
June 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
111. Benson, Hitsgalore.com, supra note 6; see also Complaint ¶ 6, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-
1387-CIV-T-26C:
HITSGALORE is currently engaged in the business of an Internet, business-to-
business search engine, and provides a searchable database for businesses bringing
people (“hits”) to their Internet websites. . . . The Company derives revenues from,
inter alia, the sale of sponsorships, keyword bid and rank rights, audio banners, adver-
tising and local city editions.
112. See Jeff Leeds, Net Firm’s Stock Plunges on News of Fraud Probe Regulation: Reports
Surface That Hitsgalore.com’s Founder Failed to Disclose, in SEC Filings, His Earlier Troubles
at Another Firm, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at C1. Another source put the company’s reported
revenue for 1998 at $20,000 and noted that its reported revenue in March of 1999 was $243,981.
See Hits Keep on Coming, BUS. PRESS, Apr. 12, 1999, at 8.
113. The date of the “reverse merger” is contested. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that it took
place in March, see Complaint ¶ 25, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C, but newspaper
accounts placed it in February, see Don Benson, Hits Just Keep Coming for Beleaguered Net
Ventures; Fallout over Past Fraud Allegations Spurs Lawsuit, Poisons Stock Deal, BUS.
PRESS/CAL., May 24, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Benson, Hits Just Keep Coming]; Hitsgalore.com
Asserts Recent Class Action Lawsuits Based on False and Misleading Bloomberg Report, BUS.
WIRE, June 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File; Leeds, supra note 112.
114. The company became publicly traded through a reverse merger with Systems Commu-
nication, Inc., in which that company acquired all of its stock. See Don Benson, ‘Net Search En-
gine Locates Favor Among OTC Investors, BUS. PRESS, Mar. 29, 1999, at 2.
115. See Complaint ¶ 29, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C; Leeds, supra note 112, at
C1. Hitsgalore.com’s common stock trades on the OTC Bulletin Board as “HITT.” See id. (“The
OTC Bulletin Board is a regulated quotation service that displays real-time quotes, last-sale
prices, and volume information in over-the-counter securities (OTC) securities.”). See generally
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 107, at 382-92 (describing the NASDAQ and the OTC market).
116. See Robert Sobel, Mania Milestones: Forget the Internet IPOs, What About Radish Oil
Bubble?, BARRON’S, Feb. 22, 1999, at 19 (discussing investor fascination with Internet stocks).
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value of Hitsgalore.com leapt from $53 million to $1 billion in less
than three months.117 In March the stock was trading at $2.38.118 By
May 10, 1999, the stock was trading at $20.69 per share.119 Hoping to
capitalize on this tremendous success, the company announced plans
to launch a nationwide advertising campaign.120 But on May 11, the
Cinderella story took an unhappy turn. Bloomberg News reported,
apparently truthfully, that a principal shareholder and “founder” of
Hitsgalore.com had had a run-in with the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) over false and deceptive promises he had made to customers
of an earlier Internet firm with which he was involved.121 The report
also implied, perhaps incorrectly,122 that Hitsgalore.com improperly
failed to disclose the FTC case to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”).123
In the wake of the report, Hitsgalore.com’s stock price cra-
tered.124 The bad press continued, and lawyers began announcing
117. See Leeds, supra note 112, at C1.
118. See Benson, Hitsgalore.com, supra note 6.
119. See id.
120. See Don Benson, Net Firm Hits Airwaves to Boost Value, BUS. PRESS, May 10, 1999, at
1 (reporting that Hitsgalore.com announced the advertising campaign in the first week of May);
Hitsgalore.com to Launch National Radio Campaign on June 1, 1999, BUS. WIRE, May 27, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (reporting the launch of a national radio adver-
tising campaign by Hitsgalore.com). Its stock price plummeted on May 12, 1999. See Leeds, su-
pra note 112.
121. See Complaint ¶¶ 30-31, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D.
Fla. filed June 1999). The plaintiffs conceded that the FTC had entered a default judgment in a
civil lawsuit against a shareholder of the “pre-merger” company, Hitsgalore.com. See id. ¶ 21.
The judgment ordered the shareholder to pay $613,110 in damages for “failing to refund money
to customers and . . . misleading investors about the potential return on investment (the ‘FTC
Civil Action’).” Id. Evidently, the shareholder, Dorian Reed, had also been convicted of wire
fraud in 1992. See Hitsgalore.com Seeks to Clarify May 27 Bloomberg Article, BUS. WIRE, May
27, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (explaining that the information re-
garding Mr. Reed’s past conviction was obtained from a voluntary disclosure in the company’s
10-K filing).
122. Plaintiff contends that Hitsgalore.com was not “legally required” to disclose the exis-
tence of the FTC action because the shareholder was not “an executive officer, director, signifi-
cant employee, promoter, or control person,” and because the civil action was not within the
category of a “reportable event” under federal securities laws. Complaint ¶¶ 22-24, Hitsga-
lore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C. In a company press release, however, the shareholder was
listed as a “director” and the “largest shareholder” of Hitsgalore.com, Inc., the company formed
by Hitsgalore.com’s merger with a Florida corporation in March of 1999. See Hitsgalore.com
Announces Resignation of Dorian Reed, BUS. WIRE, May 13, 1999, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BWIRE File. The company also conceded that the shareholder had “developed much
of the technology behind the website.” Id.
123. See Complaint ¶¶ 31-32, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
124. The stock price fell from its high of $20.69 to close the week of May 10 at $7.09. See
Benson, Hits Just Keep on Coming, supra note 113; see also Complaint ¶ 1, Hitsgalore.com, No.
99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
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plans to pursue class action lawsuits against Hitsgalore.com on behalf
of angry shareholders.125 Discussions of the company on the Raging
Bull and Silicon Investor bulletin boards also took a negative turn.126
Many message posters saw Hitsgalore.com as a “scam,” and many re-
viled its officers as “crooks,” “criminals,” and “con men.”127 One
poster, “Mr. Pink,” stated that “[t]hese crooks belong in Jail!”, and he
even dared Hitsgalore.com to sue him: “No disclaimer, this is not
opinion but a fact and if company doesn’t like it, please sue Him; dis-
covery will be a treat!”128
Hitsgalore.com obliged “Mr. Pink” by promptly suing him and
one hundred other John Doe defendants (although, notably, the
company chose to identify only one defendant by name and only four
by their “screen names”).129 The $20-million suit included claims for
libel, tortious interference, and a civil conspiracy to defame the plain-
tiff in order to unlawfully drive Hitsgalore.com’s stock price “into a
downward spiral” and thus to enable the defendants to profit by sell-
ing the common stock short.130 And, in addition to the $20 million that
plaintiff asked for in compensation for the 75% drop in its stock
price, the plaintiff also sought removal of the allegedly defamatory
postings from the message boards and an injunction against further
postings of that nature.131
A company’s decision to sue when it finds itself in a position
similar to Hitsgalore.com makes some degree of financial sense. By
announcing its decision to file suit, the company appears to respond
aggressively to the Internet rumor-mongers who revel in reports of its
demise. Bringing suit sends a message to shareholders and potential
125. See Complaint ¶ 1, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
126. See id.
127. See id. ¶¶ 39-43. Apparently some posters began calling Hitsgalore.com  “scam” prior
to the publication of the Bloomberg News article, see id., but there is no indication that these
posts affected the stock price. I am indebted to a “John Doe” for bringing this to my attention.
128. See id. ¶ 1.
129. See id. Hitsgalore.com finally sued Bloomberg and David Evans, the reporter, for libel
almost a year later. See Hitsgalore.com Files Libel Lawsuit Against Bloomberg, L.P., and David
Evans, BUS. WIRE, Apr. 28, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File. The original
suit against Janice Shell and the Doe defendants was dismissed. See Telephone Interview with
Daniel J. Becka, Esq., Counsel for Hitsgalore.com, Inc. (June 12, 2000).
At least three class action suits were filed in federal district court in California.
130. See Complaint ¶ 64, Hitsgalore.com, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C.
131. See id. ¶ 57. Granting this request would almost certainly violate the First Amendment.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that any system of
prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its constitutionality); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 698 (1931) (same).
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investors that they should not believe all the negative information
they hear about the company; it quells rumors and takes the focus
away from the negative press the company has been receiving—
whether true or untrue. Even if the company ultimately decides not to
pursue its action past filing a complaint, it may have won a symbolic
victory simply by suing John Doe.
Suing John Doe may also be a victory if it silences John Doe.132
Although “silencing” ordinarily has a pejorative connotation,133 it is
perfectly legitimate for plaintiffs to seek to stop an onslaught of of-
fensive and damaging untruths. Indeed, silencing John Doe may be
one of the chief motivations behind the new Internet libel actions.
Armed with subpoenas, plaintiffs often are able to discover the real
identity of the John Doe who has attacked them in an Internet discus-
sion forum.134 The mere fact of being uncovered may itself be enough
132. See Technical Chemicals & Products Files Defamation Lawsuit Against On-Line Post-
ers, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BWIRE File (“Through this
lawsuit, TCPI is hoping to identify the individuals using the following screen names to affect a
judgment for the defamation made by these posters as well as do its part to prevent this kind of
Internet slander from happening to other legitimate companies.”).
133. See, e.g., Robert Jensen & Elvia R. Arriola, Feminism and Free Expression: Silence and
Voice, in FREEING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 195, 199 (David S. Allen & Robert Jensen eds.,
1995) (discussing the relationship between silencing and oppression).
134. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30; Erika S. Koster & Jim Shatz-Akin, Set Phasers on Stun:
Handling Internet Fan Sites, 15 COMPUTER LAW. 18, 21 (1998) (noting that one can uncover an
Internet user’s identity by “obtaining a subpoena pursuant to a ‘John Doe’ lawsuit”). But see
Rancho Publications v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 276-78 (1999) (quashing a sub-
poena seeking the names of anonymous advertisers who had criticized a community hospital
and holding that the hospital had failed to show a compelling need for the names sufficient to
overcome a qualified immunity grounded in the speech and privacy provisions of the United
States and California constitutions).
This Article does not address the procedural rules that allow John Doe’s identity to be
revealed. The new cases suggest that it is a relatively simple matter for plaintiffs to uncover the
John Doe’s identity by filing an action against John Doe and obtaining a subpoena to have the
ISP turn over John Doe’s name and address. Although suits against Doe defendants are com-
mon, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically address what procedure plaintiffs
should follow in suing John Doe and discovering John Doe’s identity. See Carol M. Rice, Meet
John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 883, 914 (1996) (“Despite widespread use of Doe pleading, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure undermine it. Unlike most state court systems, the Federal Rules do not expressly pro-
vide for any form of fictitious name parties . . . .”). Professor Rice has offered cogent criticism of
this omission in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though some state rules may ad-
dress the problem or courts may work out their own solution, see id. at 896 n.39 (giving exam-
ples), there is a pressing need for resolution of the uncertainty surrounding the procedure for
suing unknown defendants. As an example of one court’s approach, see Estate of Rosenberg v.
Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that ordinarily “it is impermissible to name ficti-
tious parties as defendants,” but that “an action may proceed against a party whose name is un-
known if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to
be ascertained after reasonable discovery” (citation omitted)).
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to stop the alleged defamer from posting further messages.135 Suing
may be particularly effective in stopping an onslaught of damaging
messages being posted by corporate insiders,136 since the fear of losing
their jobs may make “inside agitators” tread more cautiously in the
online environment.137 This strategy may not always be successful, of
course. Some John Doe defendants have begun to fight these sub-
poenas with their own subpoenas seeking to uncover embarrassing in-
formation about the company,138 and at least one John Doe seems to
have escalated his remarks once the plaintiffs tried to uncover his
identity.139 Nevertheless, removing the cloak of anonymity from John
Doe defendants is likely also to remove their sense that anything
goes, and the mere threat of being revealed may be enough to force a
defendant to temper his remarks in the future.
Even silencing the defendant may not go far enough for some
plaintiffs. Corporate plaintiffs, like individual plaintiffs, will some-
times insist that the defendant publicly atone for posting defamatory
falsehoods, and, as Krum illustrates, this goal can be attained even
without a formal trial. HealthSouth not only sued Peter Krum but
also sought criminal harassment and stalking charges against him.140
According to court records, the abashed Krum apparently had never
realized that his words might have consequences.141 Krum made no ef-
fort to contest the suit, but instead agreed to sign an apology, pay $50
a month to a charity of the plaintiffs’ choice for a period of four years,
and to perform three hours of community service every week for two
135. In the HealthSouth case, for example, HealthSouth subpoenaed Yahoo! to reveal the
“true identity” of “I AM DIRK DIGGLER.” See Moss, supra note 4 (noting that HealthSouth’s
attorney subpoenaed Yahoo! and obtained records for about 20 of the board’s more than 300
anonymous posters). Once it was publicly revealed that “I AM DIRK DIGGLER” was really
Peter Krum, a food services employee at Penn State, Krum’s defamatory postings ceased. See
Cook, supra note 6, at 30.
136. See, e.g., Web Site Abandoned After Newspaper Files Lawsuit, DES MOINES REG., July
20, 1998, at Metro Bus. 4 [hereinafter Web Site Abandoned] (discussing how the Orange County
Register forced a gossip website to shut down after obtaining the real identity of the website op-
erator from AOL). AOL’s Rules of User Conduct provide: “America Online generally does not
pre-screen, monitor, or edit the content posted by users of communications services, chat rooms,
message boards, newsgroups, software libraries, or other interactive services that may be avail-
able on or through this site.” AOL.COM Rules of User Conduct (visited Feb. 17, 2000)
<http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
137. See Web Site Abandoned, supra note 136.
138. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30.
139. See id.
140. See Moss, supra note 4.
141. See id.
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years.142 The fact that Richard Scrushy, who makes $13 million a year,
deemed it necessary to exact this modest monetary fine on a defen-
dant who now works as a fry cook making $22,000 a year143 suggests
that the suit was not about the money but about the principle at stake:
the plaintiffs must have thought it worthwhile to score at least a sym-
bolic victory over the likes of Peter Krum.
E. David vs. Goliath?
It is tempting to portray the new Internet libel suits as David ver-
sus Goliath battles, pitting ordinary John Does against powerful cor-
porate interests out to intimidate their critics into silence. This image
is bolstered by the fact that libel suits are hard to win but easy to
bring.144 Many corporate plaintiffs that sue for Internet libel seek to
send a message to the public that they will pursue aggressively anyone
who criticizes them online, and these plaintiffs seem to be using libel
law to squelch not just defamatory falsehoods but legitimate criticism
as well (a topic this Article discusses in the next part).145 But to focus
only on the obvious power differential between corporate plaintiffs
and John Doe defendants is to ignore the real harm Internet libel can
cause.
As a rule, corporate plaintiffs have more power and wealth in the
“real world” than any anonymous John Doe could hope to have, and
in the real world that power and wealth translates into corporations’
having the ability to be heard. Corporations often will be able to con-
duct expensive media campaigns to influence favorable coverages,
142. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30 (“As part of the settlement, [Krum] had to sign a three-
page mea culpa stating his messages were ‘thoughtless lies.’”).
143. See id.
144. First, the threat of being sued is enough to chill many John Does, and libel law makes it
easy to use the tort to threaten one’s critics. Although plaintiffs rarely prevail in libel trials,
plaintiffs will find it easy to sue for libel any time they come in for harsh criticism. Indeed, the
ease with which plaintiffs can sue for libel explains why libel actions are the most common type
of SLAPP. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 11, at 217. Defamation’s anomalous doctrine of
presumed harm allows plaintiffs to sue for defamation without ever having to prove that a de-
fendant’s statements caused any actual harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 35, § 559 cmt. d; see also Anderson, supra note 53, at 749-51 (discussing illogical con-
sequences of the doctrine of presumed harm and advocating its abolition); Lidsky, supra note
53, at 44-45 (advocating abolition of the doctrine of presumed harm). The justification for the
rule—that harm to reputation “occurs in ways that are too subtle to prove”—makes some de-
gree of sense, but the practical effect is to make defamation a potent weapon for harassing one’s
critics. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 714-15 (1st ed. 1989);
see also 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.30, at 468
(1956).
145. See infra notes 169-93 and accompanying text.
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and corporate CEOs can use traditional media outlets to communi-
cate with the public.
But the Internet helps equalize power imbalances in the real
world by giving anonymous John Does like “I AM DIRK
DIGGLER,”146 “Mr. Pink,”147 or “HiSiCat”148 a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard. In the online world, every John Doe is potentially a
publisher, capable of transmitting messages instantaneously to mil-
lions of readers. More significantly, the Internet allows John Doe to
target a message to an audience with common interests and concerns,
the very audience likely to be most receptive to his comments. Thus,
for example, a John Doe who wishes to discuss the management and
future prospects of a company in which he has just invested can find a
bulletin board dedicated to the use of like-minded shareholders.
Moreover, John Doe’s online comments can have real-world effects.
While the financial bulletin boards ordinarily give notice to subscrib-
ers that the messages posted are merely the opinions of the author
and that they should not be relied on to trade,149 people do, of course,
use them to trade.150 If John Doe is a scrupulous critic of a particular
corporation and its CEO, the Internet is a powerful tool for him to
begin a dialogue about the corporation and to convey his criticisms to
a receptive audience.151
If John Doe is unscrupulous or merely reckless, however, he can
use the power the Internet gives him to inflict serious harm on the
corporation. He can pollute the information stream with defamatory
falsehoods, which may in turn influence other investors to question
the corporation’s credibility or financial health.152 Moreover, once the
defamatory information enters the information stream, it may have a
greater impact than if it had appeared in print. Because the defama-
tory statements can be copied and posted in other Internet discussion
146. See Complaint ¶ 10, HealthSouth Corp. v. Krum, No. 98-2812 (Pa. C.P. Centre County,
filed Oct. 28, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
147. See Complaint ¶ 10, Hitsgalore.com, Inc. v. Shell, No. 99-1387-CIV-T-26C (M.D. Fla.
filed June 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
148. See Complaint ¶ 5, Technical Chems. and Prods., Inc. v. John Does 1-10, No. 99-4548
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
149. See Yahoo! Finance Message Boards: Business and Fi-
nance>Stocks>Healthcare>Healthcare Facilities>HRC (HealthSouth Corp.) (visited Aug. 18,
1999) <http://messages.yahoo.com/bbs?action=topics&board=7076888&sid=7076888&type=r>.
150. See Cook, supra note 6, at 30 (noting that day traders often use message boards to
guess which stocks to buy or sell).
151. See infra Part II.B.
152. See generally Cella & Stark, supra note 30, at 793-832 (discussing the potential for
abuse by con artists of those who conduct investment activities over the Internet).
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fora, both the potential audience and the subsequent potential for
harm are magnified. And, as the persistence of Internet hoaxes dem-
onstrates,153 once a rumor takes hold in cyberspace, it may be almost
impossible to root out. Thus, to view the rise of John Doe libel suits
as merely an attempt by powerful corporations to intimidate their
critics into silence is to substitute metaphor for analysis and to sup-
press the fact that the “speech” of ordinary John Does, both scrupu-
lous and unscrupulous, has more power to affect corporate interests
than ever before.
F. Benefits of Civilizing Cyberspace
To view these libel suits as no more than attempts to silence John
Doe also ignores the potential contribution of defamation law to cy-
berspace discourse. The Internet has often been compared to the
Wild West, a frontier society free from the stifling conventions of
civilization, and some have even argued that defamation law is an un-
necessary anachronism in this new society.154 A strong argument can
be made, however, that Internet discourse could benefit from the
civilizing influence of defamation law.
“[A] civilized society,” as David Anderson has written, “cannot
refuse to protect reputation,”155 but it is worthwhile to explore why
this is so. By protecting reputation, defamation law safeguards the
dignity of citizens.156 Defamation law therefore reflects liberal soci-
ety’s “basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being.”157 Even if this were the only contribution of defamation law,
policymakers might justifiably conclude that defamation law is neces-
sary to mediate interactions between “netizens” in order to preserve
individual dignity.158 Yet, as Robert Post has shown, defamation law
153. See supra note 33.
154. See, e.g., MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS 77 (1998).
155. Anderson, supra note 89, at 490.
156. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)):
We would not lightly require the State to abandon [compensating defamed individu-
als because] the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name “reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human be-
ing—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”
157. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
158. The protection of the “dignity and worth of every human being,” however, cannot ex-
plain why defamation law should protect corporate reputation, since corporations possess only
financial interests in their reputations. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defama-
tion Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 740-41 (1986) [hereinafter Post,
Social Foundations]. My analysis here obviously owes a debt to Professor Post’s seminal article,
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exists not merely to validate the dignitary interests of individual plain-
tiffs; defamation law also helps to make meaningful discourse possi-
ble.159 Defamation law has a civilizing influence on public discourse: it
gives society a means for announcing that certain speech has crossed
the bounds of propriety.160
This civilizing influence could benefit Internet discourse in at
least two ways. First, to the extent that the prospect of being verbally
“attacked” deters some citizens from participating in Internet dis-
course, application of defamation law can help to ensure that Internet
discourse remain open to all.161 Second, defamation law might help to
cure the largest single threat to meaningful discourse in cyberspace:
incoherence. Precisely because the Internet makes every person a
publisher, the volume of information available is enormous. Further-
more, since much of the information is “published” by unknown John
Does, it is difficult to evaluate its credibility.162 Even the participants
on financial bulletin boards complain of this problem. The people
who use the boards not only seek the experience of discussing the
stock market or particular companies with like-minded individuals;
they also seek information that would enable them to evaluate a par-
ticular company. But because most users post messages pseudony-
which demonstrated convincingly that much of the modern incoherence of defamation law
stems from the fact that it is designed to protect three very different conceptions of reputation:
reputation as property, reputation as honor, and reputation as dignity. See id. at 693; see also
Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 590-98 (1997) (dis-
cussing reputation as a fundamental property interest).
159. My version of Post’s argument cannot do justice to the rich nuances of his analysis.
Those who wish to explore further should read ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS
(1995).
160. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 158, at 713.
161. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 638-39
(1990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept] (observing that “words that are deeply uncivil
‘by their very utterance inflict injury’” and that the “dignitary torts . . . carry the strong sense of
a defendant having used ‘words as instruments of aggression and personal assault’” (citations
omitted)).
162. This Article makes an extended version of this argument. See infra notes 329-32, 461-70
and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized the principle suggested here in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and has offered a “totality of the circumstances” test to de-
termine whether information provided by anonymous informants is credible enough to support
a finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) (observing that a “to-
tality of the circumstances analysis . . . permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of
all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip”); see also
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1994) (“‘Don’t underestimate the
common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writ-
ing . . . . They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permit-
ted . . . to read that message.’” (quoting New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974))).
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mously, it becomes difficult (though not impossible) to evaluate the
reliability of the information. Thus, participants criticize those who
post inane messages or those who they suspect are “bashers”—people
who post negative messages trying to drive the stock price down so
that they can profit from selling short. Some bulletin board partici-
pants even laud corporations for bringing defamation suits against
other bulletin board participants,163 indicating their recognition that
some curb on abusive or meaningless speech is necessary if meaning-
ful discussion is to occur. One bulletin board service, Raging Bull, of-
fers participants a nonlegal means of ridding the information stream
of unwanted flotsam: it offers a button that allows users to block the
messages of other users whose comments are inane, useless, or merely
annoying.164
Defamation law has the potential to curb the excesses of Internet
discourse and to make Internet discourse not just more civil but more
rational as well. It is important to note, moreover, that defamation
law can serve these functions regardless of whether plaintiffs actually
pursue their lawsuits all the way to judgment. Consider again the case
of HealthSouth v. Krum.165 The result of that case sent a powerful
message to other users of the Yahoo! financial message boards on
which Krum posted his retraction. That message—that users should
not rely on anonymity to shield them from being sued if they post
abusive and untrue messages—is one that has positive implications
for Internet discourse. The quality of speech is improved when
speakers realize that their speech has consequences.166
II. CHILLING JOHN DOE
If the only effect of these new Internet libel suits were to send a
message to Internet users that they are accountable for their speech,
163. See, e.g., SI: Stocktalk: Five Dollars and Under: Hitsgalore.com (HITT), Reply # 4549
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.siliconinvestor.com/stocktalk/msg.gsp?msgid=1167440>
(posting by “Boris Badenuff”) (chastising others that are “bashing a legitimate company”) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
164. See Heimer, supra note 4, at 53.
165. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
166. See W. John Moore, Taming Cyberspace, 24 NAT’L J. 745, 746 (1992) (“Like Wyatt
Earp arriving in Dodge City, law and order has come to cyberspace.”). Other alternatives to
defamation law include a “right of reply,” although it is not clear how effective this remedy
would be given the potential of the original message to be republished instantly in numerous
discussion fora. See Hadley, supra note 31, at 478; see also Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox:
Libel, Slander & The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 279, 286-89 (1999) (dis-
cussing alternatives to libel law).
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these suits might well be an unalloyed good. It might still be worth
questioning whether plaintiffs should be allowed to use the legal sys-
tem to pursue symbolic goals,167 but the secondary benefits of the suits
might be enough to overcome this objection.168 The problem, how-
ever, is that these new suits threaten to make Internet users too ac-
countable for their speech, thereby threatening to suppress legitimate
criticism along with intentional falsehoods. Although existing law has
a number of doctrines available to combat the chill of defamation law,
these doctrines are ill suited to the unique context of cyberspace.
A. The Chill in Cyberspace
Much ink has been spilled on the chilling effect,169 but the basic
idea is a simple one. “The very essence of a chilling effect,” as Profes-
sor Frederick Schauer has observed, “is an act of deterrence.”170
Defamation law legitimately seeks to deter individuals from commu-
nicating defamatory falsehoods; the problem arises, for First
Amendment purposes when defamation law “overdeters”—that is,
when it deters speech that is truthful or nondefamatory—for such
speech occupies a “preferred position” in the constitutional hierarchy
of values.171 In other words, the chilling effect occurs when defamation
law encourages prospective speakers to engage in undue self-
censorship to avoid the negative consequences of speaking.172 Al-
though commentators and the Supreme Court have been preoccupied
principally with the chilling effect of defamation law on the mass me-
167. See Boies, supra note 101, at 1210:
Lawsuits do not exist to provide discovery for its own sake (or to provide grist for
publicity mills), to punish criticism (fair or unfair) by imposing the expense and dis-
ruption of litigations, or even to provide an outlet for somebody’s dissatisfaction with
criticism. Lawsuits are to vindicate a legal right.
168. See Post, Social Foundations, supra note 158, at 693 (discussing how libel actions serve
community values).
169. Although the threat of “chilling” free speech is invoked talismanically as an argument
against various First Amendment restrictions, there are relatively few sustained and systematic
treatments of the “chilling effect.” The most notable exception is Frederick Schauer’s Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978) [herein-
after Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment].
170. Id. at 689.
171. See id. at 693 (“[I]f a common-law sanction aimed at punishing the publication of de-
famatory factual falsehood causes the suppression of truth or opinion, chilling effect reasoning is
again applicable.”).
172. See id. (“Deterred by the fear of punishment, some individuals refrain from saying or
publishing that which they lawfully could, and indeed, should.”).
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dia,173 chilling-effect arguments have particular resonance in cases in-
volving “nonmedia”174 defendants like those typically sued in the new
Internet libel cases.
First, these new libel suits may chill simply by threatening to re-
veal the identities of those who speak their minds online. As noted
previously, corporate plaintiffs easily can make out a prima facie libel
claim any time they receive harsh criticism online. Once a complaint
is filed, it is a simple matter to get a subpoena to force the ISP to di-
vulge the anonymous defendant’s identity.175 As more and more suits
are filed, many Internet users will come to recognize the ease with
which their online anonymity can be stripped simply by the filing of a
libel action, and they will censor themselves accordingly. Such self-
censorship is salutary to the extent that it makes Internet users more
temperate and more cautious about making unsupported factual as-
sertions.176 Indeed, the widespread use of pseudonyms online is re-
173. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 89, at 513-16 (discussing the chilling effect of litigation
costs on mass media); Bezanson et al., supra note 20, at 22 (same); Boies, supra note 101, at
1208-09 (same); Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69
IND. L.J. 689, 711 (1994) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Politics of the Mass Media] (same); cf. Steven
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV.
915, 933-34 (1978) (asserting that, since plaintiffs will rarely bring defamation actions against
“those with little resources causing little damage,” nonmedia defendants have similar economic
interests and levels of legal sophistication to those of media defendants and that therefore “the
nature of the legal standards governing liability makes little difference”). The literature on the
chilling effect of SLAPPs is useful because these suits are typically brought against nonmedia
defendants. See generally PRING & CANAN, supra note 11, at 214-15 (noting that the majority of
defendants are individuals who are “not regularly involved in political action” but who are mo-
tivated by the plaintiff’s actions).
For Supreme Court cases discussing the chilling effect of defamation suits on mass media
defendants, see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l
Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401
U.S. 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401
U.S. 279 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publ’g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
174. To call them nonmedia defendants is something of a misnomer, since the Internet is the
ultimate medium of mass communication. See infra notes 262-73 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 134.
176. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1675-76 (arguing that anonymity should not be used as
a shield for “abusive posters”); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a state law requiring authors of election-related materials to
identify themselves would foster “a civil and dignified level of campaign debate”).
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sponsible for many of the abuses perpetrated by Internet speakers.177
But revelation of identity has negative consequences as well—it may
subject the user to ostracism for expressing unpopular ideas, invite re-
taliation from those who oppose her ideas or from those whom she
criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure to her mental proc-
esses.178 There is some danger, therefore, that the growing popularity
of the new Internet libel suits may chill more than defamatory false-
hoods—it may also chill the use of the Internet as a medium for free-
ranging debate and experimentation with unpopular or novel ideas.179
The high cost of libel litigation is another source of the chilling
effect of libel suits. Media defendants identify litigation costs as a
primary source of the chilling effect,180 and these costs will fall even
more heavily on the nonmedia defendants181 who are the targets of the
177. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1675-76.
178. See Lee Tien, Innovation and the Information Environment: Who’s Afraid of Anony-
mous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 123-25 (1996). In ACLU v. Miller,
977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997), a federal district court held that a Georgia law violated the
First Amendment by requiring senders of electronic communications to identify themselves. See
id. at 1233.
179. See Tien, supra note 178, at 144 (“[C]ompelled revelation of speaker identity has seri-
ous costs for speech.”). The solution that I advocate in this Article does little to alleviate the
chill that flows solely from having one’s identity revealed. What this Article seeks to curb is the
far more serious chill that results from being forced to defend against a meritless action, and the
Article provides a theory for defendants to use in order to have such actions dismissed at a very
early stage of litigation. Moreover, a defendant might be able to use the solution that I advocate
here and still maintain his anonymity. In at least one case, for example, the ACLU filed an ami-
cus brief recommending, inter alia, that the court resolve the question of whether a defendant’s
speech constituted constitutionally protected opinion prior to ordering disclosure of the defen-
dant’s identity. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida, Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (No. 99-2831 CA
01) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The author assisted the ACLU as cooperating counsel
in drafting the amicus brief, which was filed in February 2000. See id.
180. See Anderson, supra note 89, at 516 (noting that the actual malice rule tends to further
increase defense costs); Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An
Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1789 (1998) (“[I]t is now clear that
chill on speakers comes not just from fear of damage awards, but also from concern about the
costs of litigation.” (footnote omitted)); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra
note 169, at 700 (“[T]here is a heavy price to pay for simply being in a position to have to ex-
plain, or defend.”).
181. The chilling effect is not confined to the Internet context. Note, for example, the debate
aroused when McDonald’s chose to sue two penniless pamphleteers who had criticized the
company. See JOHN VIDAL, MCLIBEL: BURGER CULTURE ON TRIAL (1997). Although the
McDonald’s case involved English rather than American libel law, many of the same issues are
presented in the new Internet libel cases.
The use of libel suits by corporations to harass their online critics is consistent with evi-
dence that corporations have used libel suits to punish those who petition the government to
adopt or reject measures that threaten the corporation’s interests. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN,
supra note 11, at 37-39 (giving an example of a suit brought by a developer against residents
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new Internet libel cases. This new class of nonmedia defendants are
unlikely to have enough money even to defend against a libel action,
much less to satisfy a judgment. Thus, wealthy plaintiffs can success-
fully use the threat of a libel action to punish the defendant for her
speech, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the libel action. As a
case in point, consider U-Haul International, Inc. v. Osborne.182 John
Osborne and his roommate, Glenda Woodrum, rented a U-Haul to
move from Florida to Georgia.183 Not only did the truck break down
numerous times, turning an eight-hour trip into a twenty-seven-hour
trip,184 but U-Haul also tried to make them pay the costs of fixing the
truck.185 Whatever the merits of U-Haul’s argument, Osborne was un-
derstandably upset about this episode. He first complained to U-
Haul’s customer service department and then to the Better Business
Bureau.186 When neither of these avenues gave him satisfaction, Os-
borne decided to use the Internet to express his displeasure. Osborne
developed a website entitled The U-Hell Website: Misadventures in
Moving as a forum to tell his own story and to let other disgruntled
U-Haul customers tell theirs.187
After an initial round of legal correspondence, U-Haul promptly
sued Osborne and Woodrum for libel and trademark infringement.
U-Haul did not sue them in Georgia, where they lived. U-Haul in-
stead chose to sue them in Arizona,188 arguing by analogy to tradi-
who had petitioned the city to reject the developer’s plan to build condominiums on a parcel of
municipal-use land).
182. No. CIV 98-0366 (D. Ariz. 1998). This case is not technically a John Doe case because
Osborne’s name appeared on the website on which the allegedly libelous statements were
posted, but it does present similar issues. U-Haul also threatened to sue at least one other indi-
vidual who created an independent U-Haul “gripe site.” See infra note 187.
183. See David Segal & Caroline E. Mayer, Sites for Sore Customers, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
1999, at A1.
184. See id.
185. See Trigaux, supra note 38.
186. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Osborne, No. CIV 98-0366.
187. See id. Osborne’s was not the only such site. Marc Becker, whose site was called U-
Haul Makes Moving Miserable, was also threatened with litigation by U-Haul. See Letter from
Rod S. Berman of Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro LLP, Attorney for U-Haul, to Marc
Becker, Author of the U-Haul Makes Moving Miserable website (Mar. 23, 1998) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal); E-mail Interview with Marc Becker (July 1, 1999). Mr. Becker
promptly sought to remove from his website the graphics that U-Haul alleged were infringing
on its trademark. See Letter from Marc Becker to Rod S. Berman (Mar. 31, 1998) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). The attorney for U-Haul then requested that Mr. Becker “cease and
desist from any use of the U-Haul mark as a meta tag in [Becker’s] website.” Letter from Rod S.
Berman to Marc Becker (July 2, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Mr. Becker’s web-
site can be found at <http://falcon.cc.ukans.edu/~marc/uhaul>.
188. See Segal & Mayer, supra note 183. The corporate headquarters of U-Haul are located
in Arizona. See Complaint ¶ 5, Osborne, No. CIV 98-0366.
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tional defamation law that Osborne had “published” his website in
Arizona because it was available to be downloaded by Internet users
there.189 But suing Osborne and Woodrum in Arizona was also a stra-
tegic means of trying to force them to capitulate to U-Haul’s de-
mands. As Osborne said, U-Haul knew that “we ha[d] no way to
travel [to Arizona] to defend ourselves. [T]he apparent aim there
[was] to prevent us from answering their charges, so that they [would]
win a default judgment against us. . . . They want[ed] us quiet.”190
Luckily for the defendants in this case, the ACLU of Arizona and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation came to their rescue by providing
them with free legal assistance.191 As a result, the Arizona suit was
dismissed, although U-Haul is currently threatening to pursue the ac-
tion in Georgia.192
Not all defendants are as lucky or as tenacious as Osborne and
Woodrum, and many would choose to forego speaking in the future
to avoid the hassle and expense of libel litigation. The great jurist
Learned Hand once wrote that, “short of sickness and death,” he
dreaded nothing more than being involved in a lawsuit.193 If this is true
for the great jurist, how much more dread and anxiety must the pros-
pect of being sued pose for the targets of the new Internet libel ac-
tions?194
B. John Doe and First Amendment Theory
As argued in Section II.E, the new libel suits can be valuable to
the extent that they deter malicious falsehoods. Thus, before lament-
ing the chill that defamation actions will have on the John Does who
frequent financial message boards, it is worthwhile to explore
whether their speech is worthy of First Amendment protection.
189. It is still not entirely clear what type of online conduct justifies a court in exercising ju-
risdiction in an Internet libel case. For a good discussion of jurisdictional issues in Internet libel
cases, see generally George & Hemphill, supra note 7.
190. See John Osborne, U-Haul Is Suing Us (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http//www.coyotes.org/
~consumer/uhell/lawsuit.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
191. See id.
192. See Segal & Mayer, supra note 183.
193. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS: 1921–22, at 89, 105 (James N. Rosenberg et al. eds., 1926).
194. A credible counterargument is that, since the defendants have “nothing to lose,” they
will not be chilled by the prospect of defamation liability. See Hadley, supra note 31, at 505 (“If
the chance of recovery is nominal once inside the courtroom, there seems almost no reason to
avoid being as vicious as possible in cyberspace.”). This point will undoubtedly hold true for
some Internet users, but even defendants of modest means have “something to lose” from being
sued, as the above discussion illustrates.
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It is easy to get lost in the hype surrounding the Internet in an-
swering this question. Scholars have touted the Internet as the living
embodiment of the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor that lies at the
heart of First Amendment theory. This idealized vision of Internet
discourse contrasts rather sharply with the reality of the financial
message boards. Discourse on the boards bears more resemblance to
informal gossip than to rational deliberation, and the culture of the
boards fosters, as one commentator put it, “disinformation, rumors
and garbage.”195 Yet, extending “breathing space” to this type of
speech may be necessary if the Internet is to fulfill its promise of giv-
ing ordinary John Does a meaningful role in public discourse.
1. The New Marketplace of Ideas. From a First Amendment
scholar’s perspective,196 the fascination of the Internet lies in its
potential for realizing the concept of public discourse at the heart of
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.197 The
dominant First Amendment metaphor for describing public discourse
is the “marketplace of ideas.”198 The marketplace of ideas is a sphere
of discourse in which citizens can come together free from
government interference or intervention199 to discuss a diverse array
195. Reliable Sources: Are 24-Hour TV and the Internet Helping People Understand Wall
Street, or Is There Too Much Bull in the Bull Market? (CNN television broadcast, July 31, 1999),
transcript available in LEXIS, Transcripts File. When asked by Howard Kurtz whether he
thought that the Internet fostered “disinformation, rumors, [and] garbage,” Jim Cramer re-
sponded that “there’s been disinformation, rumors and garbage . . . for many, many years. It’s
got a new form in some of it on the Net . . . . You’ve never had as much information at your fin-
gertips.” Id.
196. For scholarship on the First Amendment implications of the Internet, see Fred H. Cate,
The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1995); Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32; Symposium, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104
YALE L.J. 1613 (1994).
197. Professor Robert C. Post convincingly and elaborately elucidates this concept of public
discourse. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 633 (demonstrating that “the am-
bition of constitutional law [is] to create a distinct realm of public discourse independent of the
norms of any particular community”).
198. This metaphor first made its way into First Amendment jurisprudence in Justice
Holmes’s dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail . . . .”). See generally FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 74, at 10 (identifying
use of the metaphor in Milton’s Areopagitica and in the writings of John Stuart Mill).
199. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“‘[A] central tenet of the
First Amendment [is] that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.’”
(quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978))).
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of ideas and opinions.200 Ideally, the process of interacting in the
marketplace of ideas not only fosters the “search for truth”;201 it also
enables citizens to transcend their differences in order to forge
consensus on issues of public concern, or, as Professor Robert C. Post
eloquently puts it, “to speak to one another across the boundaries of
divergent cultures.”202 Public consensus, in turn, is an essential
precondition of democratic self-government.203
This, at least, is the First Amendment ideal. As a practical mat-
ter, however, many citizens are barred from meaningful participation
in public discourse by financial or status inequalities, and a relatively
small number of powerful speakers dominate the marketplace of
ideas.204 But the Internet promises to eliminate structural and finan-
cial barriers to meaningful public discourse, thereby making public
discourse more democratic and inclusive, less subject to the control of
powerful speakers, and, at least potentially, richer and more nuanced.
It therefore promises to make the marketplace of ideas more than
just a hollow aspiration.205
One of the most significant ways in which the Internet promises
to change the nature of public discourse is by allowing more partici-
pants to engage in public discussion and debate.206 The Internet gives
200. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (observing that the First
Amendment assumes that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public”).
201. Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory
of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263, 272 (1978).
202. Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 634.
203. See id. at 634-40; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protec-
tion given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
15, at 26-27 (“When men govern themselves, it is they—and no one else—who must pass judg-
ment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a
hearing as well as wise ones . . . .”).
204. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 58 (1993)
(noting financial restrictions on access to broadcasting); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the
Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1967) (observing that the
power to control both the content and availability of information rests in a relatively few private
hands); Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV 781, 787-88 (1987) (same); Eugene Vo-
lokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1806 (1995) (“The perfect ‘mar-
ketplace of ideas’ is one where all ideas, not just the popular or well-funded ones, are accessible
to all. To the extent this ideal isn’t achieved, the promise of the First Amendment is only imper-
fectly realized.”).
205. See Fred H. Cate, Comment, Law in Cyberspace, 39 HOW. L.J. 565, 578 (1996) (“The
‘marketplace’ metaphor, however worthy, has had little meaning in the physical world, where
the ability to reach large audiences is controlled by a handful of major media corporations.”).
206. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Approximately
70.2 million people of all ages use the Internet in the United States alone.”).
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citizens inexpensive access207 to a medium of mass communication and
therefore transforms every citizen into a potential “publisher” of in-
formation for First Amendment purposes.208 “[F]reedom of the
press,” as one court noted, “is [no longer] limited to those who own
one.”209 The Internet enables speakers to bypass commercial publish-
ers and editors and to speak directly “to an audience larger and more
diverse than any the Framers could have imagined.”210 Although it
may be an overstatement to say that the speech of ordinary John
Does “compete[s] equally with the speech of mainstream speakers in
the marketplace of ideas,”211 it is certainly true that ordinary John
Does need no longer win approval of the mainstream media in order
to be heard212 and that Internet discourse is more broadly inclusive
than real-world discourse.213
But the Internet not only removes barriers to speaking; it also
removes barriers to being heard. In a now well-known New Yorker
cartoon, a picture of a dog typing at a computer reads, “On the Inter-
net nobody knows you’re a dog.”214 The cartoon pithily encapsulates
207. This access is inexpensive, but not free. Many citizens will still be effectively excluded
from public debate because they cannot afford the technology necessary to use the Internet, and
still others will be barred from the debate by a lack of technical know-how. See Volokh, supra
note 204, at 1807 (noting that “poor listeners” may be “shut out” from some of the benefits of
the Internet). Even conceding these problems, however, the Internet certainly gives ordinary
citizens more access than they had previously to an avenue of mass communication. See id. at
1806-07; see also M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeep-
ers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 336 (finding that the First Amendment has not
been very concerned about “the inability of an individual to employ a particular medium [of
communication] because of a lack of education or economic resources”).
208. See GODWIN, supra note 154, at 14 (describing widespread capacity to be a “content
producer” as creating a revolution of “radical pluralism”); Ballon, Law of the Internet, supra
note 25, at 20 (same); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyber-
space, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 431 (1993) (“The network provides the facilities for individuals to
distribute their messages efficiently and cheaply, both widely and narrowly, to large groups as
well as small.”); Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1141 (“[T]he Internet is capable of main-
taining an unlimited number of information sources, thereby eliminating concerns about ‘scar-
city’ that currently plague the broadcast media.”); see also David J. Goldstone, The Public Fo-
rum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339-40 (1995).
209. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (entering a preliminary injunction against the enforcement
of 47 U.S.C. § 231, a provision of the Child Online Protection Act).
210. Id.; see also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1141 (noting that “the Internet has
no ‘gatekeepers’—no publishers or editors controlling the distribution of information”).
211. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
212. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a
New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 437 (1998) (observing that the Internet liberates “the
‘marketplace of ideas’ from the institutional dominance of publishers, distributors, broadcast
media, and other traditional gate-keepers of speech”).
213. See Volokh, supra note 204, at 1807.
214. Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61 (cartoon).
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one of the chief attractions of online anonymity.215 Many participants
in cyberspace discussions employ pseudonymous identities, and, even
when a speaker chooses to reveal her real name, she may still be
anonymous for all practical purposes. For good or ill, therefore, the
audience must evaluate the speaker’s ideas based on her words
alone.216 This unique feature of Internet communications promises to
make public debate in cyberspace less hierarchical and discriminatory
than real-world debate to the extent that it disguises status indicators
such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and age, which allow elite speak-
ers to dominate real-world discourse.217
The Internet also challenges existing hierarchies of power that
permeate public discourse by making it harder for powerful speakers
to control the interpretation of public events.218 The mainstream me-
dia no longer have the power to exclusively define what is “news,”219
215. For discussion of the dark side of online anonymity, see Tien, supra note 178, at 150-51.
216. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 161, at 640 (“In most circumstances we
attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the social context of her words, as we
do to the bare content of her communication.”).
217. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1108-09
(1993). Some commentators also wisely point to the dangers that the Internet poses to minority
groups. For example, the Internet has become a forum for bigots of all types to come together
to reinforce their antisocial beliefs. See JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND
RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 486-87 (1999) (discussing the use of the Internet by hate
groups); Volokh, supra note 204, at 1834 (noting that the “shift of control to listeners” may
make it easier for them to remain closed-minded because they will select only information that
confirms their existing prejudices).
218. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
“the increasingly prominent role of mass media in our society and the awesome power it has
placed in the hands of a select few”); Stephen L. Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Ma-
nipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 582 (1984) (reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983))
(“[T]hose willing and able to pay have the ability to spread their messages.”); Kristine A. Os-
wald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 385, 407-08
(1994) (describing the tools that policymakers use to manipulate traditional media); see also
Robert M. O’Neill, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation, 73 WASH. L.
REV. 623, 624-25 (1998) (observing that journalistic standards for deciding what to publish seem
to be lower in cyberspace).
219. The extraordinary success of Internet “journalist” Matt Drudge demonstrates this
point. The Drudge Report, Matt Drudge’s website, aims to provide political gossip to its sub-
scribers and visitors. See Roger Bull, Online and Loving It, FLA. TIMES UNION, Feb. 27, 1998, at
D1. Many subscribers are themselves members of the mainstream press and political insiders.
See David McClintick, Town Crier for the New Age, BRILL’S CONTENT (Nov. 1998),
<http://www.brillscontent.com/features/cryer_1198.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Drudge gathers information for his report using two computers, one telephone, a police scanner,
and a television, and he publishes the information from his studio apartment. Drudge lays claim
to “scooping” the mainstream press on the presidential impeachment scandal. See Howard
Kurtz, Clinton Scoop So Hot It Melted: Newsweek Editors Held off in Scandal Story, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 1998, at C1 (“[W]ord of [Newsweek]’s suppressed scoop leaked out through an
increasingly familiar route: Matt Drudge’s Internet gossip column.”). While Newsweek debated
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and governments, particularly authoritarian governments, have less
power to control public discourse220 by controlling the information
their citizens receive.221 Wealthy and powerful private speakers may
similarly find it more difficult to impose their agendas by manipulat-
ing media coverage. By changing the locus of control of public dis-
course, the Internet may therefore contribute to the development of
an informed citizenry capable of deciding its collective fate.
A more subtle benefit of the Internet to public discourse is its po-
tential for making public discourse richer and more nuanced. The
more speakers who engage in public debate, the more perspectives
that will be brought to bear on public problems. And beyond simply
allowing more people to speak, the Internet also gives people more
topics about which to speak.222 The Internet allows people to tran-
scend the limits of geography in order to find those with similar inter-
ests, and no topic is too obscure to generate Internet discussion.
Moreover, speakers are able to experiment with controversial or un-
popular ideas online, thereby making Internet debate more free-
whether it was ethical to divulge Monica Lewinsky’s name before she had been indicted by Ken
Starr, Drudge preempted the debate by publishing the story on his website. See Howard Kurtz,
Out There; It’s 10 Past Monica, America, Do You Know Where Matt Drudge Is?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 1999, at F1. What the incident tellingly illustrates is the challenge that “journalists” like
Drudge present to the ability of the mainstream media to decide what issues are appropriate for
public debate. I have previously criticized this incident as indicating that concern for individual
privacy receives few rewards in the marketplace of ideas. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying,
Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 173, 181 (1998). The Drudge Report appears at <http://www.drudgereport.com/>.
220. See Salbu, supra note 29, at 436 (noting that, by making original government docu-
ments available, the Internet offers “an alternative to filtered information”); Scott E. Feir,
Comment, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted Repair of Rupture in China’s Great
Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 361, 384 (1997) (observ-
ing that “[t]here is concern [in China] that Internet technology is weakening the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s control over people”).
221. In authoritarian governments, this takes the form of direct control of the mass media;
in democracies, governments ensure that their “spin” is put on public events described in the
mainstream media. When citizens have access to the Internet, however, they have access to in-
formation coming from beyond their country’s borders and hence beyond the control of their
leaders. By making it impossible for governments or private entities to control what information
the public receives, the Internet may therefore aid in the formation of an informed citizenry. See
Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 32, at 1143 (highlighting the importance of global computer
networks in conveying information to the outside world about the use of Chinese troops to sup-
press protest in Tiananmen Square in 1989).
222. See Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1640 (“[W]e now have within our grasp a technology
designed to bring together like-minded individuals, regardless of where they live, work, or play,
to engage in the creation of a new type of democratic community: a community unbounded by
geographical, temporal, or other physical barriers.”); Volokh, supra note 204, at 1833 (noting
that, although a “greater diversity of available speech need not lead to diversification of what is
actually consumed,” it nonetheless serves “those people whose tastes differ from the major-
ity’s”).
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ranging and expansive than real-world debate. Thus, the number and
type of discussions in which citizens engage are bound to expand, and,
as they do, the nature of public discourse is likely to change as well.223
2. Chaos in the Marketplace? This high theory contrasts rather
markedly with the nature of actual discourse on the boards. A
primary justification for protecting the marketplace of ideas from
governmental interference is that competition of ideas in the
marketplace fosters the search for truth. Indeed, this justification was
the underpinning of Justice Holmes’s famous defense of the “free
trade in ideas,” in which he argued that “the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”224 If the speech of anonymous John Does in cyberspace
fosters the search for truth, it is largely by accident. As anyone who
has spent time perusing the financial message boards knows, board
discussions are no model of rational deliberation and informed
debate. Idle speculation, unintelligible musing, and “off-topic” trivia
predominate over serious financial discussion, and many of the
participants appear to lack financial sophistication. The operative
principle is speed rather than accuracy, and the idea seems to be that
users should present whatever tidbits of rumor or speculation they
can and the audience can sort it out.225
Discourse on financial message boards resembles informal gos-
sip226 more than it does formal written conversation. Indeed, Sissela
Bok’s observations about the informal character of gossip form a use-
223. As Professor Volokh has observed, the Internet brings us closer to realizing the ideal-
ized premises of First Amendment doctrine than do print and broadcast media. See Volokh, su-
pra note 204, at 1847.
224. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 71 (1975); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (questioning whether the marketplace theory
fosters the search for truth).
225. See, e.g., Ballon, supra note 25, at 16 (“Time, rather than content, often is the commod-
ity being marketed in cyberspace.”); Heimer, supra note 4, at 54 (discussing how Raging Bull
and most other investment-related boards rely on the readers’ ability to collectively address un-
founded claims or other inappropriate posts).
226. Gossip is defined by Sissela Bok as “informal personal communication about other
people who are absent or treated as absent.” SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 91 (1982); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 333
(1983) (defining gossip as “the exchange of personal information about character, habits and
lifestyles”).
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ful point of comparison.227 Like gossip, discourse on the boards “lacks
formal rules setting forth who may speak and in what manner, and
with what limitations from the point of view of accuracy and reliabil-
ity.”228 Discourse on the boards is, like gossip, highly “spontaneous,”
and it “relies more on humor and guesswork” than it does on rational
argumentation. Also like gossip, it is a form of discourse that forces
the audience to take an active role in gleaning the valuable bits of in-
formation from the great mass of chaff.229
Nevertheless, the boards are not useless as a source of informa-
tion.230 If one “lurks”231 around long enough on a message board, ob-
serving the ongoing, rambunctious, and often disjointed dialogue over
a period of time, one can become adept at judging the credibility of
individual participants based on the quality and tone of a participant’s
remarks and the interaction between that participant and others.232
Often, too, one goes to the financial boards to get a “feel” for what is
being said about the corporation rather than to gather actual facts;
what is important is the general tenor of the discussion, rather than
any particular factual assertion.233
Thus, even if the financial message boards do not further the
search for truth in a direct and efficient manner, they do allow those
interested in a particular corporation to gather information that may
not be supplied by traditional media outlets.234 The message boards
may even help to remedy the “‘chronic tilt [that] distorts mainstream
227. See BOK, supra note 226, at 91; see also Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyber-
space, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (“In some sense, cyberspace communica-
tion is very speech-like. People speak informally.”).
228. See BOK, supra note 226, at 91.
229. See JACK LEVIN & ARNOLD ARLUKE, GOSSIP: THE INSIDE SCOOP (1987). As a book
on online etiquette admonishes newcomers to Internet message boards, “Don’t assume that
posted information is correct, and don’t spread it around if you have any questions at all about
it.” VIRGINIA SHEA, NETIQUETTE 67 (1994).
230. See Moss, supra note 4 (“Serious investors find merit in the boards. . . . ‘Looking at and
monitoring the boards is something a prudent analyst has to do.’” (quoting Howard Capek, a
stock analyst at Warburg Dillon Read, New York)).
231. SHEA, supra note 229, at 6 (“‘Lurking’ is reading the discussion group correspondence
without actually participating . . . . Lurking gives you an idea of who the participants are and
what the tone of the discussion is.”).
232. In this respect, too, board discussions are like informal spoken conversations in the
“real world.” One must still “consider the source”; it is just that evaluating source credibility is
more difficult in the online environment.
233. See Heimer, supra note 4, at 53 (advising that the quality of the information varies
greatly and that one should not “bet the farm on a message-board tip”); Moss, supra note 4
(noting that the message boards let participants vent their feelings).
234. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 4 (observing that “[s]erious investors find merit in the
boards”).
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media coverage of grave, persisting, and pervasive abuses of corpo-
rate power.’”235 This is not to say that the speech of anonymous John
Does is as important a source of financial information as, say, the
Wall Street Journal or CNBC.236 The typical John Doe is not a finan-
cial journalist, and the boards are often cluttered with pointless ram-
blings.237 Yet, to the extent that participants in online discussions learn
more information about a corporation through a message board, it is
still a valuable, albeit flawed, source of specialized financial informa-
tion.
From a First Amendment perspective, the financial message
boards contribute to the marketplace of ideas by encouraging citizens
to participate in public decisionmaking. The financial message boards
exercise a powerful democratizing effect on public discourse about
the publicly held corporations that shape citizens’ daily lives. Publicly
held corporations exercise tremendous influence in American society:
they influence “what we buy, where we work . . . which diseases we
cure, [and] much, much more.”238 At a minimum, therefore, the
boards provide an avenue for citizens to converse with one another
and to seek consensus about topics that affect their lives. But the
boards also serve as a kind of informal education for investors and
noninvestors alike about the behavior of a particular corporation,
about the workings of the stock market,239 and about economic mat-
ters in general.
By providing a forum for discussion of financial matters and by
contributing to citizens’ store of knowledge about such matters, the
boards help to shape public opinion.240 But the boards also help citi-
235. Shiffrin, Politics of the Mass Media, supra note 173, at 711 (quoting Morton Mintz, a
Washington Post reporter). Professor Shiffrin also notes that libel laws often “discourage ag-
gressive media reporting” because “[c]orporations often have the resources and the will to bring
a lawsuit.” Id.
236. See FARRELL, supra note 3, at 217 (“CNBC . . . is the leader in providing up-to-the-
minute news on the financial markets.”).
237. See, e.g., supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
238. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (1991).
239. The extraordinary growth in the number of individual investors in the stock market,
which is itself attributable to the Internet to a large degree, has spurred the success of the finan-
cial message boards. See FARRELL, supra note 2, at 2 (“In the matter of a few short years, the
Internet has changed the very landscape of investing . . . . Trading stocks has never been
cheaper or more accessible.”).
240. Thus, even if discourse on the message boards contributes only marginally to the
“search for truth,” it promotes “participation in decision making by all members of society.”
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970). Alexander
Meiklejohn is perhaps most famously associated with the philosophy that the First Amendment
protects speech essential to “democratic self-governance,” and many of Meiklejohn’s argu-
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zens to transform public opinion into action.241 The more citizens
know about economic matters, the more likely they are to make in-
formed voting decisions. More significantly, the boards provide an
important “back channel” for individual shareholders to convey their
feelings to the corporations in a market largely dominated by institu-
tional shareholders,242 especially since, as noted above, many CEOs
closely follow what is said about their corporation on the financial
message boards.243 Even if the “buzz” on the boards does not directly
influence corporate decisionmaking, it may influence decisions indi-
rectly. And, if the boards have even a tiny impact on corporate be-
havior, they have broad social ramifications not limited to the partici-
pants in online discussions. Indeed, it is the worry that message
ments, when taken out of context, would support extending broad First Amendment protection
to discourse in cyberspace. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, passim. Meiklejohn argued, for ex-
ample, that the First Amendment’s “primary purpose” is to guarantee “that all the citizens shall,
so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life. That is why no idea,
no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from
them.” Id. at 88-89. This argument supports the provision of broad First Amendment protection
to speech on message boards. Financial message boards, for example, deal with issues of corpo-
rate behavior and corporate decisionmaking that have ramifications beyond the financial self-
interest of shareholders. And certainly most message boards deal, if only tangentially at times,
with “issues which bear upon our common life.” Id. Meiklejohn, however, did not envision a
fully participatory model of discourse. For him, the appropriate model of discourse was “the
traditional American town meeting,” a forum that regulates the speech of participants to attain
particular goals. Id. at 22. “What is essential,” wrote Meiklejohn, “is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.” Id. at 25. But see Robert C. Post, Meikle-
john’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 COLO. L. REV.
1109, 1117 (1993) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s “town meeting model” because “it reflects an insuffi-
ciently radical conception of the reach of self-determination”).
241. Some commentators even seem to contend that raising citizens’ awareness of economic
affairs and the behavior of corporations has the potential to generate more social and economic
reform than participation in overtly political discourse. See James A. Fanto, Investor Education,
Securities Disclosure, and the Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm
Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 15, 33-34 (1998) (“Without dramatizing the issue, there are politi-
cal and ideological implications in failing to instruct people about the consequences of their
ownership of property and in encouraging them to view such ownership in a limited way.”);
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to
Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33, 81 (1997).
242. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 238, at 181 (“Institutional shareholders now hold the
majority of common stock.”).
243. See Rebecca Buckman, Gumshoe Game on the Internet: Companies Hire Private Eyes
to Unmask Online Detractors, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999, at B1:
With an explosion of online corporate chat by investors, more companies are hiring
private eyes to track down people posting anonymous messages they don’t like.
Though the freewheeling banter is frequently off-base, companies fret that investors
may believe—or trade stock on—what they see posted on a Web site or a stock-
message board.
See also Moss, supra note 4.
245. See Buckman, supra note 243.
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boards will transform opinion into action that prompts many compa-
nies to hire others to monitor what is being said about them on the
web, to hire private investigators to track down online detractors,245
and even to sue anonymous John Does for libel.
Any argument that message boards further First Amendment
values must, of necessity, concede that much of the conversation on
the boards is cryptic, uninformed, and inane.246 But “uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open debate”247 will often be cryptic, uninformed, and
inane, especially when such debate is not restricted to educated elites
but is expanded to include ordinary John Does. Thus, to concede this
point does not detract from the importance of the boards as an outlet
for ordinary citizens to discuss corporate behavior, to vent frustra-
tions, and to have some small measure of input into corporate deci-
sions that affect not only their own lives but those of their fellow citi-
zens.
3. The Pitfalls of Participatory Public Discourse. A central
premise of First Amendment theory in the twentieth century has been
that truth is best gathered “out of a multitude of tongues,”248 and the
Internet promises, if nothing else, to put this theory to the test.
Already there are indicators that the “new” public discourse will look
quite different from the old. As the financial message boards
demonstrate, a financial discourse that includes ordinary John Does
looks quite different from a discourse dominated by Wall Street
analysts.249 Discourse on the boards is lively and engaging, providing
“the masses” with a highly accessible source of information and
education about the stock market. The boards give ordinary citizens
an opportunity to become active participants in an ongoing dialogue
about economic affairs and, in the process, allow them to transform
the way business is done.250
But fostering a more participatory public discourse may come at
a high cost. Speech from a “multitude of tongues” may lead to truth,
246. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
247. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
248. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
The Supreme Court cited this language with approval in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967).
249. See Moss, supra note 4 (“Until the Internet came along, the traffic in opinion about
stocks and bonds was largely—and for the most part calmly—controlled by Wall Street ana-
lysts.”).
250. See id.
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but it may also lead to the Tower of Babel.251 And the level of dis-
course on the financial message boards also suggests that fostering
unmediated participation may make public discourse not only less ra-
tional and less civil; it also runs the risk of making public discourse
meaningless. A discourse that has no necessary anchor in truth has no
value to anyone but the speaker,252 and the participatory nature of
Internet discourse threatens to engulf its value as discourse.
The problem, therefore, is to strike a balance between free
speech and the preservation of civility. If the goal of making public
discourse more participatory and ultimately more democratic is to be
realized, the speech of ordinary John Does merits a very wide ex-
panse of “breathing space,”253 wider than it currently receives. First
Amendment doctrine therefore cannot hold ordinary John Does to
the standards of professional journalists with regard to factual accu-
racy, because part of what gives the Internet such widespread appeal
is the fact that it allows ordinary citizens to have informal conversa-
tions about issues of public concern. Although any approach to the
problems posed by the new Internet libel actions must respond to the
unique culture of the message boards, the law cannot allow that cul-
ture to degenerate into a realm where anything goes, where any em-
bittered and malicious speaker can lash out randomly at innocent tar-
gets. Although many of the new libel plaintiffs are powerful corporate
Goliaths suing to punish and to deter their critics, some are not. Some
are simply responding in the only way available to prevent aggres-
sively uncivil speech, the sole purpose of which is to cause emotional
and financial harm. Hence, any solution to the problems posed by
251. In the Tower of Babel account, the people of the earth began to build a tower “whose
top may reach unto heaven.” Genesis 11:4 (King James). When God saw the tower, he said:
Behold the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do:
and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go
to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand
one another’s speech.
Id. 11:6-7 (King James). The next verses reveal the aftermath:
[T]he Lord scattered [the people] abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth:
and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because
the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the
Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of the earth.
Id. 11:8-9 (King James).
252. My thanks to Professor David A. Anderson for bringing this point home to me.
253. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (“[E]rroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have
the breathing space that they need . . . to survive . . . .” (citation and internal quotation omit-
ted)); see also Cate, supra note 196, at 15 (discussing rationales for extending a “breathing
space” around constitutionally protected speech). For further discussion, see infra Part II.C-D.
